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Introduction
Over the last forty years, the volume of international trade has increased enormously, vastly
outpacing the growth in world GDP. This observation is often regarded as a defining element
of the process of globalization. Interestingly, over the same period, the distribution of income
across countries has changed considerably. For example, over the period 1960 to 1998, the
distribution of output–per–worker across countries hollowed–out substantially, as mass moved
away from the mean of the distribution towards two emerging modes (see Quah [1997], Jones
[1997], Beaudry, Collard and Green [2002] among others), thereby giving rise to a bi-modal or
Twin–Peaked distribution. This simultaneity among the two phenomena is rather intriguing
and it is natural to ask whether they may be related. In particular, it is relevant to ask whether
the different growth performances underlying the change in the world distribution may be the
result of an unequal distribution of the gains associated with globalization. This issue is the
object of study of the paper.
As noted by Krugman and Venables [1995], one potential explanation for why countries may
vastly differ in their benefits from globalization has to do with the size of their home markets.
For example, if certain sectors of the economy exhibit increasing returns to scale (as in Ethier
[1979]), then big countries could reap a disproportionate share of the gains associated with the
reduction of trade frictions, since they would tend to specialize in the sectors with increasing
returns. Alternatively, pecuniary externalities associated with agglomeration may also allow
large economies to appropriate much of the gains of free trade.1 Under either of these scenarios,
it would not be surprising to see the world distribution of income change during a period of
globalization as large and small countries would have very different economic performances.
However, the main weakness of any scale based explanations of observed changes in the cross–
country distribution has to do with its predictions with respect to the growth–size relationship.
Indeed, such explanations generally imply that during the process of globalization there should
emerge a strong positive relationship between measures of size and economic growth. But, as
we will review, the cross–country data over the period 1960–98 do not provide much evidence
in favor of such a mechanism. Hence, it seems that some other process must be at work.
In this paper, we present and analyze a model of globalization in which there are productivity
gains associated with specialization, but no scale effects. The main claim of the paper is that
such a model provides a simple explanation for the observed changes in the world distribution
of income over the last forty years and that, especially important, we show that its central
1The literature that examines links between some type of economy of scale and trade is vast, for example
see Ethier [1979, 1982], Krugman [1979], Helpman and Krugman [1985], Grossman and Helpman [1991], Fujita,
Krugman and Venables [1999]. Within this literature, there are important distinctions between the sources
of economies of scale. For example the New Economic Geography (as surveyed by Neary [2001]) emphasizes
pecuniary externalities, while the earlier literature often emphasized non–pecuniary externalities.
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mechanism receives considerable support in the data. Although the model is standard on many
fronts, it departs from the literature by allowing sectorial productivity to be influenced by the
degree to which a country specializes in a particular sector. Hence it is not scale that is relevant
in the model, but the degree of specialization. It should be noted that the structure of our
model has similarities with many models in the economic geography literature (see for example
Ciccone and Hall [1996]) which emphasize productivity gains associated with the density of
activity rather than the scale of activity.
The benchmark model we develop is a two good, two factor model with dynamic comparative
advantage. The dynamics are driven by an interaction between (i) the gains to specialization and
(ii) the process of capital accumulation. The gains to specialization arise in the capital intensive
sector and take the form of improved quality for intermediate goods directed at the capital
intensive sector. As we shall show, if these gains to specializations are sufficiently strong, then
the move from an autarkic world equilibrium to a free trade equilibrium generates a hollowing–
out of the middle of the distribution and the emergence of more than one mode in the world
distribution of output.
One of the key elements in our model is the interaction between gains to specialization and the
process of capital accumulation. In particular in our model, the main determinant of whether
a country gains disproportionately from the opening up of trade depends on its tendency to
accumulate capital. For example, a country with a high saving rate and a low rate of labor
force growth will tend to specialize in the high capital intensive sector and thereby improve its
productivity in that sector. This aspect of the model leads to implications that, during the
process of globalization, one should witness the emergence of an abnormally strong link between
a country growth rate and its tendency to favor capital deepening (as measured by its investment
rate or saving rate, as well as its rate of labor force growth). As we shall show, this prediction
of the model finds considerable support in the data.
The remaining sections of the paper are as follows. In section 2 we review a set of observations
related to changes in the world distribution over the period 1960–98 (these summarize many
of the observations documented in Beaudry et al. [2002], hereafter BCG) and we present a
simple conceptual framework for organizing these observations. In section 3, we present the
benchmark model. In Section 4, we examine some of the empirical implications of the model.
Since many of the assumption in the benchmark model are rather extreme, in Section 5 we
discuss generalizations. Finally, the last section offers concluding remarks.
Globalization, Gains from Specialization and the World Distribution of Output 3
1 Changes in the Distribution of Output–per–Worker
In this section, we first review the salient changes in the cross–country distribution of the output–
per–worker that occurred over the period 1960–1998.2 Then we present a simple framework that
helps clarify the different types of explanations which could be behind such changes. Finally, we
use the framework to illustrate why theories emphasizing scale effects do not find much support
in the data. In the later sections, we will apply a similar approach to evaluate our proposed
model.
1.1 The Emergence of Twin–Peaks
Figure 1 reports the distribution of (log) output per worker across the set of Non–Sub–Saharan
African countries. The data are taken from the world Penn tables 6.0 for both the years 1960
and 1998.3 We choose to highlight here the set of Non–Sub–Saharan African countries as to
emphasize changes in the distribution of income which are not simply the results of the well–
known poor growth performance of the Sub–Saharan Africa countries. The plotted distributions
are kernel density estimates based on a Gaussian kernel.4 Both distributions are expressed
as deviations from the given year’s mean in order to emphasize changes in the shape of the
distribution. It should be noted that the actual distribution shifted substantially to the right
from 1960 to 1998. The average output–per–worker increased by 134% between 1960 and 1998
for the 75 countries we consider, implying an average annualized rate of growth of 2.27%. Figure
1 also reports the points in the distribution associated with the interquartile ranges in 1960 and
1998.5 As can be seen from the figure, the shape of the distribution changed considerably from
1960 to 1998. In effect, it was clearly uni–modal — and close to normal — in 1960, and it
hollowed–out in the middle as to become bi–modal. This observation corresponds to what Quah
[1993] and Jones [1997] call the twin–peaks phenomenon.6 As can also be seen from Figure 1,
the change in the distribution is captured by a substantial widening of the interquartile range.
Indeed, the interquartile range expanded by more than 25% between 1960 and 1998.
2Most of the observations discussed in this section can also be found in other work such as Quah [1993] Jones
[1997], and Beaudry et al. [2002].
3See Appendix A.3 for the list of countries.
4The density estimates are computed using the Rosenblatt–Parzen kernel density estimator. We used a Gaus-
sian kernel, with an optimal bandwidth parameter chosen as h = 1.0592σN−1/5 where σ is the standard deviation
of the data and N is the number of observations.
5The points of the interquartile range are calculated from the raw data and not from the kernel estimates of
the density function.
6To see changes in the distribution that include the Sub–Saharan countries, see Beaudry et al. [2002].
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Figure 1: Across-Country (log–)Income Distribution: 1960–1998
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1.2 Explaining Changes in Distributions: a Simple Framework
Before examining whether any particular model can explain the change in the distribution
observed in Figure 1, it is helpful to ask the following question: What characteristics must a
model possess to explain a hollowing–out of a distribution and the potential emergence of twin
peaks? To answer this question, let us consider the following simple framework where output–
per–worker (in log) is represented by yt and xt represents a set of exogenous variables that
influence yt. The relationship between yt and xt can be expressed as follows.
yt = gt(xt) (1)
where gt(·) is a potentially time–varying function, as captured by the index t. This structure al-
lows the relationship between output–per–worker and any exogenous force to potentially change
over time, as could be induced for example by a reduction of trade frictions. Assuming that xt
is distributed according to the probability density function (pdf hereafter) µxt (.), the standard
change of variable formula implies that the pdf of yt, denoted µt(.), is
7
µ(yt) =
µxt [g
−1
t (yt)]
|g′t(g
−1
t (yt))|
(2)
The conditions which will lead to a hollowing–out (i.e. less mass) in the middle of the distribution
can most easily be seen by examining the behavior of the distribution of yt around its median.
Let us therefore define x̂t and ŷt as the deviations of, respectively, x and y from their median x
m
and ym = g(xm). Let us also consider two consecutive periods, referred to as 0 and 1 hereafter.
The distribution over the first period of log output–per–worker may then be written as
µy0(y) =
µx0 [g
−1
0 (ŷ + g0(x
m))]
|g′0(g
−1
0 (ŷ + g0(x
m)))|
(3)
and over the second period as
µy1(y) =
µx1 [g
−1
1 (ŷ + g1(x
m))]
|g′1(g
−1
1 (ŷ + g1(x
m)))|
(4)
The hollowing–out in the middle of the distribution can then be studied by focusing on what
happens at the median — i.e. when ŷ = 0 — in which case, from (3) and (4)
µy0(y) =
µx0(x
m)
|g′0(x
m)|
and µy1(y) =
µx1(x
m)
|g′1(x
m)|
(5)
As it should be clear from (5), a hollowing–out in the middle of the distribution may result from
(i) a hollowing–out of the distribution of the driving forces (xt), as defined by:
µx1(x
m) 6 µx0(xm)
7In order to keep notations to the minimum, we are deriving the distribution under the assumption that X is
a scalar. The generalization is trivial.
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or (ii) a modification of the determination of y — i.e. an increased sensitivity of output–per–
worker and the driving force, as defined by:
|g′1(x
m)| > |g′0(xm)|
Hence, in light of this simple framework, one can infer that any relevant model of the ob-
served change in the distribution of output–per–worker should either (i) explain and document
a hollowing–out of the distribution of a driving variable that affects yt or (ii) explain and docu-
ment an increase in the marginal effect of a variable xt on yt. A nice feature of an explanation
in the first category is that it can be directly examined by looking at the distribution. An
equally nice feature of the second class of explanations is that it can be examined by simple
use of regression analysis (or even more appropriately by a median based regression) since such
analysis should detect changes in the function g(·). Since, as documented in BCG, the distri-
butions of most variables that one may conceive as affecting output–per–worker do not seem
to have hollowed–out8, it seems most likely that an explanation to the observed change in the
distribution will need to fall in the second category. Accordingly, in this paper we present and
examine an explanation to the observed change in the distribution falling in category (ii).
In concluding this subsection, let us note that the above framework can also give insight into
the a bimodal distribution around the median. For example, assuming that the distribution of
driving forces, µxt (.), is unimodal and is time–invariant, then the emergence of twin peaks of the
type exhibited in Figure 1 will arise if, for some δ,
g′1(x
m − δ) 6 g′1(xm) and g′1(xm) > g′1(xm + δ) (6)
This condition corresponds to the emergence of a local non–concavity of the g(.) function around
the median. Hence, even if µxt (.) is unimodal, it is possible to explain the emergence of bi-
modality by explaining the emergence of a strong local non–concavity in the g(·) function.
Our goal in Section 3 will be to illustrate how, in the presence of gains from specialization,
the process of globalization (defined as a move from an autarkic world equilibrium to free trade
equilibrium) can trigger a hollowing–out of the cross–country distribution of output–per–worker.
However, before presenting our model, we will briefly overview why we need to look beyond
models that emphasize scale effects if we want to explain the change in the distribution.
1.3 Why Economies of Scale is not the Solution?
As we mentioned in the introduction, one potential class of explanations for the observed change
in the cross–country distribution of income comes from models which emphasize economies of
8Typical examples are the distribution of education levels and investment rates.
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scale. In this class of models, the process of globalization may change the distribution of income
by changing the relevance of scale. Using the notation introduced above, this class of models
suggests that a relevant variable to consider for x is a measure of scale and that the marginal
effect of this variable should be seen to increase over the process of globalization. To examine
the empirical relevance of this idea, it is helpful to consider a partial adjustment model for (log–)
output–per–worker yt, where yt converges at rate λ towards its long run equilibrium given by
the time varying function gt(xt). Then the growth in output–per–worker can be expressed as
yi,t − yi,t−1 = λgt(xi,t) + (1− λ)yi,t−1
If we further assume that gt(·) can be approximated by a linear function with time–varying
parameters Υ·,t, we have the following regression model of output growth in country i:
yi,t − yi,t−1 = Υ0,t +Υ1,txi,t + (1− λ)yi,t−n (7)
where Υ0,t and Υ1,t are respectively a time varying intercept and a time varying slope coefficient
obtained from the linear approximation of gt(·). More generally, (7) can be seen as a special case
of a growth regression with time–varying coefficients. This equation indicates that the relevance
of models with economies of scale in explaining the hollowing–out of the world distribution
income can be gauged by examining whether the parameter for scale in a growth regression
increased in importance over the period 1960–98. To explore this possibility, we run a series of
20 rolling regressions of 19 years in length, where we regress growth of output–per–worker over
each eighteen year window on the initial value of output–per–worker, a measure of scale and
other controls.9 Figure 2 reports the results obtained when we control for the investment rate,
the rate of adult–population growth, and educational investment. Two series of coefficients on
scale are reported in the figure: one for OLS estimates (grey line) and the other for IV estimates
(dark line). The confidence interval associated to IV estimates is also reported (dashed line).
The first coefficient corresponds to the regression estimates over the period 1960–1978, and the
last coefficient corresponds to the results over the period 1980–1998. The two measures of scale
used are the total GDP in the initial year and the total population in the initial year. As
it can be seen from the figures, the coefficient associated with the scaling effect remained (i)
insignificant and (ii) steady over the years. These graphical results indicate that the effects of
scale did not contribute significantly to the determination of growth over the last 40 years of
the twentieth century nor did it change in importance over time. In order to assess the latter
issue more formally, we also perform a test of whether the coefficients on scale change between
the period 1960–1978 versus the period 1978–1998 for the different specifications considered in
Figure 2. Table 1 reports the stability test statistics as well as the associated p–values. As can
be seen from the table, the data do not support any evidence for a structural break in the scale
9The results are robust to alternative size of the window.
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Figure 2: The Scale Effect: Rolling Regression
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Note: The dashed lines are the upper and lower bound for 95% confidence interval (IV).
Table 1: Stability Tests
OLS IV OLS IV
(Educ.) (Educ.)
Scale variable: GDP
Q(Scale) 1.503 0.834 0.461 0.059
[0.220] [0.361] [0.497] [0.808]
Scale variable: Population
Q(Scale) 1.786 1.361 0.666 0.373
[0.181] [0.243] [0.414] [0.541]
Note: p–value in brackets.
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effect. Actually, the coefficient associated to the scaling variable is never found to be significant.
This implies that these data do not provide empirical support for scale type stories.
Having established that something other than scale effects likely affected the cross country
distribution of income, we now propose an explanation based on gains to specialization.
2 The model
This section describes a simple model of globalization, which is aimed at explaining the hollowing–
out of the world distribution of output–per–worker. The model consists of a continuum of coun-
tries that produce and exchange tradable goods. We first present the behavior of agents in each
economy, insisting on the production side, and then turn our attention to the determination of
the equilibrium.
2.1 Individual behaviors
We consider a world with a continuum of countries indexed by i, i ∈ [1, N ]. In each country,
there are two potentially tradeable goods, with quantities of goods produced in country i at
time t denoted by Z1,i,t and Z2,i,t.
The Z1 good is produced using intermediate goods M1 according to the production function:
Z1,i,t =M1,i,t (8)
where M1 is a composite of intermediate goods Qi,t(`), such that
Z1,i,t =
(∫ 1
0
Q1,i,t(`)
ρd`
) 1
ρ
with ρ < 1 (9)
In contrast to good Z1, the Z2 good is assumed to be produced using intermediate goods and
capital according to:
Z2,i,t = AK
α
i,tM
1−α
2,i,t (10)
with M2 being composed by the following quality weighted CES aggregate
10 of intermediate
goods Qi,t(`):
M2,i,t =
(∫ 1
0
(
θ si,t(`)Q2,i,t(`)
)ρ
d`
) 1
ρ
with ρ < 1 (11)
10Note that the index of intermediate goods is characterized by the same elasticity in the two sectors. This
restriction can be relaxed without any difficulty. This would only complicate the analysis by multiplying sub–cases
without altering much the results.
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In (11), θ si,t(`), ` ∈ (0, 1), denotes a subjective quality assigned by the firm in sector 2 to the
intermediate good Qi,t(`) sold by firm `. This index reflects the possibility that the intermediate
good Q(`) can be more or less productive for sector 2.
The important aspects that differentiate the two tradeable goods are their capital intensities
(with good Z2 being the capital intensive good) and the sensitivity of good Z2 is sensitive to
the quality of intermediate goods.
Assuming firms in the tradeable goods sector take prices as given, then the demand for each
intermediate good by sector 1 is given by
p1,i,t(`) = Q1,i,t(`)
ρ−1M1−ρ1,i,t (12)
where p1,i,t(`), ` ∈ (0, 1) is the price of each intermediate good ` sold to firms in sector 1, and
the good Z1 is taken as the nume´raire. Accordingly, the demand for each intermediate good
directed to sector 2, is given by
p2,i,t(`) = θ
s
i,t(`)
ρQ2,i,t(`)
ρ−1pi,tAK
α
t M
1−α−ρ
2,i,t (13)
where pi,t is the price of good Z2,i,t and p
2
i,t(`) is the price of each intermediate good ` sold to
firms in sector 2.
We assume that each intermediate good Qi,t(`), ` ∈ (0, 1), is produced by a monopolistic com-
petitive firm by means of effective units of labor. Specificly, one unit of effective labor is required
to produce one unit of good, that is,
Qi,t(`) = Q1,i,t(`) +Q2,i,t(`) = ΓtLi,t(`) (14)
where Li,t(`) is the labor employed by intermediate producer ` in country i at time t, and Γt
denotes labor augmenting technological progress which is assumed to grow at the exogenous rate
γ ≥ 0 (Γt = (1 + γ)Γt−1). It may be helpful to think of Q
1
i,t(`) and Q
2
i,t(`) as slightly different
intermediate products sold by the same firm.
We now address the issue of the determination of the quality of intermediate goods going into
the production of Z2. What we want to allow for is the quality of an intermediate good used by
producers of Z2 to depend on the degree of specialization of an intermediate producer in terms
of its supply to sector 2 relative to sector 1. To introduce this notion as simply as possible, let
us assume the following relationship between the share of total output that producer ` devotes
to sector 2,
Q2,i,t(`)
Q1,i,t(`)+Q2,i,t(`)
, and let θi,t(`) be defined as follows
θi,t = θ
(
Q2,i,t(`)
Q1,i,t(`) +Q2,i,t(`)
)ε
(15)
The above determination of θi implies that labor productivity in sector 2 increases as interme-
diate good firms direct a greater share of their production to sector 2. This reflects a type of
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quality–by–specialization phenomenon.11 Although we do not model the internal structure of
the firm that gives rise to this effect, we believe it is a description of technology that is worth
exploring. In our main analysis, we assume that firms that produce Z2 cannot directly monitor
quality and hence they demand intermediate goods based on their expectation of quality. Given
this assumption, intermediate good firms will not try to manipulate quality, and quality will act
as an externality.12 Also let us note that, as in much of the trade literature which emphasizes
economies of scale in the capital intensive sector, our model has economies of specialization only
in the capital intensive sector.
Given the demands from both sector 1 and 2, the problem of firm ` ∈ (0, 1) can be seen as to
maximize profits by choosing prices and allocating labor to production directed at the different
sectors. Denoting by σi,t(`) ∈ [0, 1] the share of total labor, Li,t, allocated to the production of
good 1, the program of an intermediate firm is given by
max
{Li,t(`),p1,i,t(`),p2,i,t(`),σi,t(`)}
p1,i,t(`)σi,t(`)ΓtLi,t(`)+ p2,i,t(`)(1−σi,t(`))ΓtLi,t(`)−Wi,tLi,t(`) (16)
subject to (12)–(13), where Wi,t is the wage rate in economy i.
In order to complete the description of this economy, it is necessary to specify how physical
capital is accumulated. To this end, we assume that there is a final good Y , obtained by
combining the two tradeable goods according to a Cobb-Douglas technology of the form:
Yi,t = (Z1,i,t −X1,i,t)
ϕ(Z2,i,t −X2,i,t)
1−ϕ with ϕ ∈ (0, 1) (17)
where X1,i,t and X2,i,t denote net exports of tradable goods 1 and 2. The price of this final
good is denoted by pyi,t. Final good producers take prices as given and select the combination
of tradeable goods that maximizes profits.
This final good can be either consumed or invested by households to create capital. For sim-
plicity, we assume, following Solow [1956], that investment represents a constant share of final
output, si ∈ (0, 1), such that Ii,t = siYi,t. Therefore, consumption is given by Ci,t = (1− si)Yi,t
and the law of motion of capital is given by
Ki,t+1 = siYi,t + (1− δ)Ki,t, Ki,0 > 0 given (18)
The labor force in each economy is assumed for now to grow at a common rate n > 0 such that
Li,t+1 = (1 + n)Li,t, Li,0 given. (19)
11It may be more natural to allow the quality to change slowly over time. For example by setting θi,t+1(`) =(
θ
(
Q2,i,t(`)
Q1,i,t(`)+Q2,i,t(`)
)ε)λ
θi,t(`)
1−λ with λ ∈ (0, 1). However, since we will focus on steady states, such a dynamic
formulation would not change anything in the long–run. Hence, for sake of simplicity and in order to save on
notations, we will keep with the proposed formulation.
12Since this assumption is questionable, it is worth noting that many of our results are robust to allowing
intermediate good firms to internalize the value of quality as we will discuss in footnotes.
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Hence, countries are allowed to differ only in terms of their saving rate. In fact, it will be helpful
to think of countries being differentiate according to the index νi =
si
(1+n)(1+γ)−(1−δ) , which can
be referred to as the country’s propensity to accumulate capital.13 The variable ν is assumed to
be distributed according to the probability density function µν(·) across countries, which does
not change over time.
In what follows, it will considerably reduce notation to abstract from labor augmenting tech-
nological change by setting γ = 0 and Γ0 = 1. An attractive feature of this simplification is
that it will allow us to disregard the distinctions between output–per–worker and output–per–
effective worker, which greatly eases presentation. However, let us emphasize that setting γ = 0
is without loss of generality as it essentially leaves our results unchanged up to some minor
algebraic complications. We will accordingly denote per–worker variables by lowercase letters,
for example y and k for output and capital. Also, it will be convenient to adopt the following
normalization for θ = ( φ
φ+(1−α)(1−φ))
−.
2.2 Equilibrium
We are interested in comparing two types of equilibria for this economy: an autarkic equilibrium
and a free trade equilibrium.
A world equilibrium consists of a sequence of prices P = {Wi,t, qi,t, pi,t, p
y
i,t; i = 1, . . . , N}
∞
t=0,
where qi,t is the real rental rate of capital and a set of allocationsQ = {Ki,t, σi,,t(`), Li,t(`), Q
j
i,t(`),
Yi,t, Z
j
i,t, X
j
i,t; ` ∈ (0, 1); j = 1, 2; i = 1, . . . , N}
∞
t=0 such that,
1. Given the sequence of prices P, Q solves the firms’ problem;
2. Given a sequence of allocations, Q, P clears the markets;
3. Capital accumulates according to equation (18);
4. International markets clear in the sense that
– In the absence of trade (autarky), Xji,t = 0
– If there is free trade, pi,t is independent of i and trade is balanced in each economy
— i.e. X1i,t + ptX
2
i,t = 0
For future reference, it is useful to note that when we refer to a country’s level of output we
mean the quantity given by
Ci,t + Ii,t =
1
pyi,t
Z1,i,t +
pi,t
pyi,t
Z2,i,t
13This is a natural interpretation of this quantity as it represents the country’s long run capital–output ratio.
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This is the value of production calculated in units of the final good and is the value of national
income.
3 From Autarky to Free Trade
This section examines how when moving from an autarkic equilibrium to a free trade equilibrium
— which we refer to as the process of globalization — output–per–worker is affected by potential
productivity gains associated with specialization. We start by assuming that the world econ-
omy is composed of a continuum of closed economies that all live in autarky and show that each
economy behaves as the standard Solow [1956] growth model with Cobb–Douglas technology. In
particular, we show that the only exogenous cross–difference in the model, which is the propen-
sity to accumulate capital, just retrieves its standard level effect on output. More precisely, if
the distribution of ν, the propensity to accumulate capital, is uni–modal, the distribution of
output–per–worker (and also its logarithm) is also uni–modal. We then open the economies and
show how free trade will lead to a hollowing–out of the distribution of output–per–worker and
the emergence of new modes when there are gains to specialization.
For each case — the autarkic and free trade equilibrium — we first examine the determination
of output taking a country’s capital labor ratio as given. Then we study properties of the cross–
country distribution when physical capital is allowed to adjust to its steady state value. As it
can be expected, the resulting distributions will be affected by the distribution of ν. We should
immediately emphasize that, for clarity of presentation, we are assuming countries differ only
in terms of their propensity to accumulate capital (ν). Obviously, this assumption is at odds
with the data since it is well known that differences in ν can only account for a fraction of the
cross–country differences in income levels. One way to remedy this failure would be to allow
workers across countries to differ in terms of their effective units of labor. However, for our
purposes, this would only complicate matters without providing extra insight. Hence, we choose
to focus on how differences in propensities to accumulate capital provide insight to changes in
the cross–country distribution of income over time, knowing that such a focus leaves unexplained
much of the cross–section distribution at a point in time.
3.1 Autarky
In the absence of international trade, the model we have presented takes a very simple form.
In particular, as stated in Proposition 1, aggregate output in the country is given by a simple
Cobb–Douglas production function.14
14The interested reader is referred the Appendix for proofs of the Propositions.
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Proposition 1 In the absence of international trade, the relationship between output–per–worker
and capital–per–worker is given by
yt = Bk
α(1−ϕ)
t (20)
with B ≡ ϕ
ϕ((1−α)(1−ϕ))(1−α)(1−ϕ)
(ϕ+(1−α)(1−ϕ))ϕ+(1−α)(1−ϕ)
A1−ϕ.
Two aspects are worth emphasizing about Proposition 1. First, to understand this and later
proposition, it is helpful to note that the amount of labor time being allocated by each interme-
diate good firm between the production of type 1 versus type 2 type intermediate goods does not
change as the capital–labor ratio changes. In effect, as the capital–labor ratio increases the pro-
duction of the type 2 good increases, but this leaves unchanged the ratio of marginal productivity
of labor across the two activities. Therefore, as the capital–labor ratio increases, a country does
not become more specialized in the production of the capital intensive good. Accordingly, there
is no interaction between the degree of gains to specialization and capital–labor ratios. Hence,
as can be seen in Proposition 1, changes in  do not affect the aggregate production function.15
Second, Proposition 1 makes it clear that the model is essentially a collection of standard Solow
growth models and therefore shares its main features. This can be easily understood by noting
that, in the absence of trade, the world economy essentially consists of the collection of closed
economies that all produce and sell the final good on their local market. A direct implication of
this result is that the model generates the standard negative relationship between cross–country
growth in output per worker and its initial level, and a positive (negative) relationship with the
saving rate (population rate of growth). It also has strong implications for the cross–country
distribution of (log–) output–per–worker.
We now turn to the determination of the cross–country distribution of output–per–worker when
we allow capital to adjust to its steady state level. Given the capital accumulation equation (18)
and the aggregate production function given in Proposition 1, one can immediately notice that
the closed economy model behaves as a standard neoclassical growth model. Indeed, the steady
state value of yi in a country with a propensity to accumulate capital given by νi is :
yi,t = B
1
1−α(1−ϕ) ν
α(1−ϕ)
1−α(1−ϕ)
i (21)
It is now straightforward to derive the steady state distribution16 of y, which is given in the
next proposition.
15The result that  does not affect the aggregate production function is in part the result of the convenient
normalization in the specification of the gains to specialization.
16Note that since the logarithmic function is strictly monotonic, the the distribution of log output–per–worker
inherits the shape (in particular the uni– or bi–modality) of the distribution of output–per–worker.
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Proposition 2 In the absence of international trade, the steady state distribution of output–per–
worker is given by
µy =
1− α(1− ψ)
α(1− ϕ)
ga(y)
y
µν(ga(y))
where ga(y) = B
1 1
α(1−ϕ) y
1−α(1−ϕ)
α(1−ϕ) and µν(·) denotes the distribution of ν.
As can be seen in Proposition 2, the distribution of output–per–worker essentially consists in
a re–scaling of the distribution of ν by a monotonic function, ga(y), of y. A direct implication
of this linearity is that if the propensity to accumulate capital, ν, is distributed according to
a unimodal distribution, then the distribution of output–per–worker inherits this unimodality
under autarky. Hence, unless the accumulation forces have twin–peaked distribution — for
which we do not have much evidence in the data — the model generates a unimodal distribution
of output–per–worker in the long run.
3.2 Free trade
We now examine the implications of opening up trade for the equilibrium distribution of output–
per–worker. To derive these implications, we need to resolve two distinct questions. First, we
need to determine how a country’s aggregate level of output changes when it can trade both
type of goods (Z2 and Z1) in the world market at relative price p. Second, we need to determine
the world relative price p. Our approach is to focus on the first question and adopt a convenient
approximation for the second. In effect, we assume that world price of Z2 in terms of Z1 under
free trade can be approximated by the median price under autarky. That is, the world price
under free trade is taken to be the equilibrium relative price pi,t that arises in an autarkic
economy with ν = νm. Although this is a strong assumption, we believe that it is a quite
reasonable approximation. For later reference, it is convenient to denote by k? the steady state
capital–labor ratio for an autarkic economic with ν = νm.
In order to better characterize the main properties of the economy, it is helpful to determine the
conditions for full specialization under free trade. This is undertaken in Lemma 1.
Lemma 1 There exists a level of capital per efficient worker, denoted by k˜(p), above which a
small open economy specializes in the production of good 2. Furthermore the threshold level,
k˜(p), is a decreasing function of the elasticity, ε, and
lim
ε→ α
1−α
k˜(p) = k?
The intuition for Lemma 1 is standard from international trade theory. As in any Hecksher and
Ohlin type model, economies specialize in the production of the good which is intensive in the
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factor they have in abundance. Hence, when the economy has accumulated a sufficiently high
level of capital per efficient worker, it specializes in the production of good 2, which is capital
intensive. Given this notation, we can now present the relationship between a country’s capital
labor ratio and its level of production. In all that follows, it will be helpful to assume that
ε < α1−α as to ensure that a country’s production possibility frontier is continuous.
Proposition 3 If 0 6 ε < α1−α , then under free trade a country’s level of output–per–worker is
given by
y =
{
Φpϕ−1
(
1 + α1−α(A(1− α)θ
1−α
p)
1
α−ε(1−α)k
α
α−ε(1−α)
)
if k 6 k˜(p)
ΦpϕAθ
1−α
kα if k > k˜(p)
where k˜(p) ≡
[
A(1− α)θ
1−α
p
]−1
α
and Φ = ϕϕ(1− ϕ)1−ϕ.
This proposition is illustrated in Figure 3, where the production function is depicted under both
autarky and free trade. In the autarkic situation, the technology is strictly concave, as implied
by Proposition 1. When world trade is available, Proposition 3 indicates that as long as  is
positive, the production function will display a local convexity stemming from the productivity
effects of specialization. This can be seen from the fact that the exponent on k is α
α−ε(1−α) > 1
when k 6 k˜(p).17 In order to understand this local convexity, it is useful to first consider the
case with no gains to specialization (ε = 0). Panel (a) of Figure 3 corresponds to this situation.
When  = 0, international trade causes the aggregate production function of the economy to
become a linear function of the capital labor ratio in the zone where both goods Z2 and Z1 are
produced (k 6 k˜(p)). This result stems from the ability of firms to reallocate labor between the
2 sectors, therefore avoiding decreasing returns to capital. In effect, any change in the capital
labor ratio when k 6 k˜(p) induces a reallocation of labor between the two sectors. Since this can
be done while simultaneously maintaining both a fixed relative price and a fixed capital–labor
ratio, there are no decreasing returns to capital. In contrast, when the capital–labor ratio is
high enough — i.e. when k > k˜(p) — the economy fully specializes in the production of the
capital intensive good and aggregate production becomes concave. In the case with gains to
specialization, ε > 0, the effect of reallocating labor across sectors as the capital labor ratio
17At this point, one may think that the local convexity is created solely by the presence of the externality.
However, it is straightforward to verify that if the returns to specialization were internalized by the firm, the
proposition would still hold but the technology would take the form
y =
{
Φpϕ−1
(
1 + α
1−α
(A(1− α)(1 + ε)θ
1−α
p)
1
α−ε(1−α) k
α
α−ε(1−α)
)
if k 6 k˜(p)
ΦpϕA(1 + ε)θ
1−α
kα if k > k˜(p)
where k˜(p) ≡
[
A(1− α)(1 + ε)θ
1−α
p
]−1
α
and Φ = ϕϕ(1−ϕ)1−ϕ. This therefore makes it clear that what matters
to the result is the openness of the economy rather than the externality case. In other words, the local convexity
of the production frontier essentially originates in the globalization phenomenon and therefore trade.
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Figure 3: Production function and local convexities
(a) No returns to specialization (ε = 0)
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Note: ∆(ν) denotes the combinations of y and k that are consistent with a
steady state: ∆(ν) = {(y, k) ∈ R+ × R+ : k = νy}.
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increases (when k 6 k˜(p)) causes countries with higher capital labor ratios to achieve higher
productivity in sector 2. This is due to the fact that they produce good Z2 more intensively.
The gains to specialization effect thereby creates a local convexity in the aggregate production
function as illustrated in Panel (b) of Figure 3. When the capital per efficient worker is greater
than k˜(p), the economy fully specializes in the production of good 2 and exhausts all potential
gains stemming from productivity gains specialization. The production function then regains
its strict concavity back.
It should be noticed that as the economy increases the share of labor it allocates to the production
of intermediate good directed to sector 2 (Q2), the productivity in the sector increases due to
specialization. This rise in productivity creates an additional incentive to reallocate production
towards sector 2. Hence, the presence of gains to specialization decreases the threshold above
which it is optimal to choose full specialization in the production of good 2. An important
aspect to note from Figure 3 is that the presence of gains to specialization causes the slope of
the aggregate production function to become steeper when evaluated at k?.
Having established that free trade can create a local convexity in a country’s aggregate pro-
duction function and increase the slope of this function, we now investigate the effect of this
property on the steady state distribution of output–per–worker.
3.3 Free Trade and the Distribution of Output–per–Worker
This section shows how the process of globalization can give rise to both a hollowing–out in
the distribution of output-per-worker and the emergence of twin–peaks. We consider two cases.
We first consider the case of moderate gains to specialization, and show that even in this case
twin peaks can emerge. We then show that when gains to specialization are large enough the
model exhibits multiple steady state equilibria, none of which are consistent with a unimodal
distribution.
3.3.1 The case of moderate gains to specialization
The case of moderate gains to specialization corresponds to a situation where 0 6 ε < α. In
such a case, the following proposition can be established on the steady state of each economy.
Proposition 4 If 0 6 ε < α, then under free trade all economies possess a unique steady state.
Proposition 4 indicates that when the productivity gains to specialization are not too strong,
then the local non–convexity in the production function economy does not cause the emergence
of multiple equilibria, and hence the mapping between νi and yi is well–behaved.
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A nice feature of the model is that even in the case of free trade, it is again simple enough to allow
for an analytical derivation of the whole distribution of output–per–worker across countries, as
given below.
Proposition 5 For 0 6 ε < α, the steady state distribution of output–per–worker is given by
µy(y) =

µs (g1(y)) g1(y)
[
αΦ− ε(1− α)p1−ϕy
αy(p1−ϕy − Φ)
]
if y 6 y˜(p)
µs (g2(y))
1− α
α
g2(y)
y
if y > y˜(p)
where y˜(p) = Φp
ϕ−1
1−α ,
g1(y) ≡
Ψ
y
(
yp1−ϕ − Φ
Φ
)α−ε(1−α)
α
with Ψ ≡
(
1− α
α
)α−ε(1−α)
α (
A(1− α)θ
1−α
p
)− 1
α
and
g2(y) =
[
ΦpϕAθ
1−α
]− 1
α
y
1−α
α
Having characterized the general shape of the world distribution of income, we can now study
the main implications of free trade on this distribution, and more particularly the effect of the
presence of gains to specialization. This analysis is summarized in the next proposition.
Proposition 6 If 0 < ε < α, allowing free trade will cause:
1. a hollowing–out of the middle of the distribution of output–per–worker in the sense that
the density at the median will be lower under free trade;
2. the income distribution to exhibit at least two modes if ε is sufficiently close to α.
Proposition 6 contains the main implications of the model. The first result on the hollowing–
out of the middle of the distribution can be easily understood by referring to Section 1.2 and
Figure 3. We saw in Section 1.2 that for the density of output–per–worker to reduce at the
median of the distribution — in the absence of a change in the distribution of ν — it must
be the case that the marginal effect of the propensity to accumulate, ν, on output–per–worker,
y, evaluated at the median ν must increase. Since we saw in Figure 3 that the slope of the
aggregate production function evaluated at k? increases under free trade, it should come as no
surprise that the marginal effect of ν on y (evaluated at median νm) increases under free trade.
More formally,
∂yft
∂ν
∣∣∣∣
ν=νm
> ∂y
a
∂ν
∣∣∣∣
ν=νm
if 0 <  < α
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where a and ft respectively denote autarky and free trade. The intuition underlying this result
can be found in the existence of gains to specialization. This is illustrated in Figure 3, where,
in addition to the aggregate production functions, we also included the line that represents the
combinations of y and k that are consistent with a steady state. This locus of points is derived
directly from the accumulation equation and corresponds to y = k/ν. A steady state equilibrium
in this model is simply a crossing point between this locus and the aggregate production function.
The figure then illustrates how our hollowing–out result in Proposition 6 depends crucially on the
presence of gains to specialization. In effect, in the absence of gains to specialization,  = 0, the
model predicts that the free trade would leave the density around the middle of the distribution
unchanged. Indeed, when there are no gains to specialization, the aggregate production function
is linear for values of the capital stock below the full specialization threshold k˜(p). This implies
that, around the median, the sensitivity of output–per–worker with respect to ν is not affected
by the opening of trade, since the new aggregate production function is tangent to the autarkic
production function. This can again be inferred from panel (a) of Figure 3 since the free trade
is shown not to affect the slope of the aggregate production function at the median. Conversely,
when there exist gains to specialization, ε > 0, not only can the economy avoid decreasing
returns by specializing in the production of type 2 good, but it also becomes more productive.
Therefore, any change in the accumulation behavior exerts a larger effect on output–per–worker
— i.e. the sensitivity of output–per–worker to ν is greater. This can be seen from panel (b) of
Figure 3 as free trade makes the aggregate production function to display local convexity in a
neighborhood of k?.
The second issue addressed in Proposition 6 relates to whether globalization can create a twin–
peaked distribution. Although this issue is closely related to the notion of a hollowing–out of the
distribution, it is distinct since it requires that mass away from the middle of the distribution
either increases substantially more – or decreases substantially less – than mass around the
middle. In the proof of Proposition 6 we show that as  approach α from below, the density
near the middle goes to zero and therefore there necessarily emerges more than one mode in the
distribution. This type of results can be inferred graphically by noticing that as the gains to
specialization get strong enough, the aggregate production function becomes close to tangent to
one of the steady state locus. In this case, the sensitivity of output–per–worker to ν becomes
infinite when evaluated at this point and the associated density goes to zero.
Although Proposition 6 does not indicate that the process of globalization will necessarily cause
twin peaks to emerge, it does show that such a change can arise in the model.
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3.3.2 The case of strong gains to specialization
In this section we briefly examine the effects of allowing free trade when the gains to specialization
are strong, in the sense that  > α. In this case, as stated in Proposition 7, the possibility of
multiple equilibria arises.
Proposition 7 For α < ε < α1−α there exist two levels of ν, ν and ν, such that if ν ∈ [ν; ν],
an economy admits three steady states level of output–per–worker, otherwise it admits a unique
steady state.
Proposition 7 establishes that when the productivity effect of specialization is strong enough
there exists a range of propensities to accumulate capital which give rise to multiple steady
states. This is illustrated in Figure 4. As can be seen from the figure, when the propensity
Figure 4: Multiplicity
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Note: ∆(ν) denotes the combinations of y and k that are consistent with a
steady state: ∆(ν) = {(y, k) ∈ R+ × R+ : k = νy}.
to accumulate capital is low (ν < ν), the steady state is unique and corresponds to a partial
specialization with a relatively low capital labor ratio. Conversely, when the propensity to
accumulate capital is very high (ν > ν), the high tendency to accumulate capital together with
the gains to specialization lead such an economy to specialize totally in the production of the
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capital intensive good. Furthermore, the figure makes it clear that there exists a cone defined by
the two propensities to accumulate capital ν and ν within which an economy admits three steady
states. The two lowest ones lie on the convex part of the production frontier and correspond
to a partial specialization situation. The third steady state lies on the concave part of the
frontier and illustrates that such an economy also admits a steady state with full specialization.
Indeed, when specialization enhances productivity, any increase in the capital stock exerts two
effects. First, an increase in the capital labor ratio triggers a reallocation of labor toward the
capital intensive good sector in order to avoid the effects of decreasing returns. Second, it
drives productivity upward in that sector through the specialization mechanism. When ε is high
enough, this latter mechanism is strong enough to induce a faster pace of accumulation, which
further increases productivity. Hence it is the complementarity between accumulation and gains
to specialization which gives rise to multiple equilibria.
Proposition 8 documents the stability properties of the three steady state.
Proposition 8 Under free trade, for α < ε < α1−α , the two outside steady states are stable, such
that for any given propensity to accumulate capital ν ∈ [ν; ν] we have
If k0 < k
ft
2 the economy converges to k
ft
1
If k0 > k
ft
2 the economy converges to k
ft
3
where kft1 , k
ft
2 , k
ft
3 are the three steady states in ascending order.
Proposition 8 shows that out of the three steady states, only two — the external — are stable.
This phenomenon is represented in Figure 5, which illustrates how an economy that starts with
a high enough capital per efficient worker (k0 > k
ft
2 ) will eventually fully specialize and end up
with a high capital–labor ratio. In other words, the economies that start above their central
steady state, for example because of their autarkic position, will greatly benefit from free trade.
Once again the economic intuition for this result is simple and is found in the standard Hecksher
and Ohlin argument. If an economy starts with a high capital–labor ratio, it will allocate under
free trade a larger share of its workers to the sector that is capital intensive. This induces gains
to specializations that raise the marginal efficiency of capital, which then leads the economy to
accumulate more capital and therefore reinforces the initial effect. The economy then eventually
reaches the highest steady state.
Conversely, let us now consider an economy which is initially poorly endowed in capital (k0 <
kft2 ). Proposition 8 makes it clear that such an economy will not be able to take advantage of
specialization, and will end up in the lowest steady state despite the fact it may be characterized
by the same propensity to accumulate capital. In other words, the model exhibits hysteresis if
ν ∈ [ν, ν].
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Figure 5: Stability
6
-
kft1 k
ft
2 k
ft
3 k
y
Free Trade
∆(ν)
-- ffffff --- ffffff
Note: ∆(ν) denotes the combinations of y and k that are consistent with a
steady state: ∆(ν) = {(y, k) ∈ R+ × R+ : k = νy}.
In the case of strong returns to specialization, it becomes even more apparent how the process of
globalization can cause a hollowing–out of the distribution and the emergence of twin peaks. In
particular, in this case, there is a whole range of values of output–per–worker, within the support
of steady values of output–per–worker, which are not steady state. Hence, the distribution of
output–per–worker in that case would become completely hollowed–out and therefore there
would necessarily emerge at least two modes.
4 Empirical Evidence
The model presented in the previous section suggests that the opening up of trade could be
the central force underlying the observed change in the cross–country distribution of output–
per–worker. In this section we want to present evidence in support of the particular mechanism
which induces a change in distribution in our model.
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4.1 Assessing the model’s direct implications
One of the model’s main implication is that, over a period of globalization, we should observe
the emergence of an abnormally high relationship between a country’s propensity to accumulate
capital and its growth rate. We now investigate empirically the relevance of this prediction of
the model. To this end, we begin by reporting a set of cross–country regressions relating growth
in output–per–worker to its initial level and to its propensity to accumulate capital, as captured
by K, which will be our empirical counterpart for log(ν)
Ki,t = log
(
si,t
(1 + ni,t)(1 + γ)− (1− δ)
)
In the construction of Ki,t, we follow Mankiw, Romer and Weil [1992] and impose a 3% annual
depreciation rate of capital (δ = 0.03) and a 2% rate of technological growth (γ = 0.02).18
Furthermore, the country’s saving rate is proxied by its’ investment rate (si,t = (i/y)i,t), and
set ni,t to the country’s annualized rate of growth of labor force. Note that even though we
kept n constant in the model, we are allowing it to vary in this section. The main observation
Figure 6: Effect of propensity to accumulate capital (Rolling Regressions)
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that we want to highlight is the extent to which the role of this measure of the propensity to
accumulate capital has changed over the 1960–1998 period. To address this issue, we begin
by reporting estimates associated with a series of very simple rolling regressions. Our basic
regression consists of regressing the growth of output per worker19 on the average value of K
18Setting these parameters to alternative values leaves our main results unaffected.
19See appendix A for a definition of the variables
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and the initial level of output per worker, with each variable measured in relation to the given
window. Each regression is estimated by OLS and IV. We also report results when we control
for educational investment. Our measure of educational investment is a weighted average of
school enrollment for primary, secondary and tertiary degrees of education, as documented in
Barro and Lee [1993].20 This measure departs from the Mankiw et al. [1992] specification of
educational investment and rather follows Klenow and Rodr`ıguez-Clare [1997] who argue that
focusing on this wider educational investment class is more appropriate. However, we should
note that our findings are very robust to varying the measure of educational investment. In
both case, we will report results from OLS and IV estimation.
We chose a 19 years window, which corresponds to half of our sample length. Figure 6 reports the
estimated coefficients on K obtained from rolling regressions over the whole sample, with each
variable measured in relation to the given window.21 As can be seen in the figure, the importance
of this measure of a country’s propensity to accumulate capital increase substantially over the
period. In effect, it almost tripled irrespectively of the estimation procedure or the inclusion of
additional variables (such as education, or scale effects).
In what follows, we will document the robustness of this observation along several dimensions.
First, we will allow the two components of K to enter the regression separately. That is, we
will run the regression allowing the country’s investment rate and its labor growth to enter
separately, instead of bundling it together in K. If the forces emphasized in our model are
relevant, we should observe the importance of each of these factors to increase over the process
of globalization. Once again, we also allow an additional regressor our measure of educational
investment.
Figure 7 reports the estimated coefficients on population growth and investment rate obtained
from rolling regressions over the whole sample, with each variable measured in relation to the
given window. The figure displays four series corresponding to the choice of estimation procedure
(OLS or IV) and inclusion or not of our measure of educational investment. In the IV procedure,
the variables used to instrument the investment rate and population rate of growth are the initial
level of the investment rate, the average consumption rate over the sub–sample (which proxies
the saving rate), and the average growth rate of population over the 15 first periods of the sub–
20The weights for calculating this measure of educational investment correspond to the average number of years
spent in each degree
Educ ≡ log
(
6× EP + 6× ES + 4× ET
16
)
where EP , ES and ET denote respectively the enrollment rate in the primary, secondary and tertiary sector.
21We estimate a series of regressions with the first regression using observations 1 through 19, the second
regression using observations 2 through 20, etc. . .We also explored window sizes between 15 to 25 years, all of
which led to similar conclusions. In Beaudry and Collard [2002] this approach was used to examine changes in
the growth process among OECD country’s.
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Figure 7: Importance of Growth factors: Rolling regressions
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sample when we consider our baseline regression. The latter instrument is aimed at correcting
for the potential endogeneity of fertility within each window, as it takes at least 15 years for
fertility to affect the labor force. Hereafter, this set of instrument will be referred to as IV?.
When Education is added, IV? is completed by the years of schooling. This is a stock rather than
a flow measure of education and is hence less sensitive to endogeneity over short periods. The
plain dark line in the figure corresponds to OLS estimation of our benchmark equation where
output per worker is regressed on adult-population growth, the investment rate and the initial
level of output per worker. The dashed dark line refers to the IV estimation of this benchmark
regression. Grey lines corresponds to OLS (plain) and IV (dashed) estimation of our regression
where education is introduced.
As can be seen from the figure, there has been a continuous increase in the magnitude of both
the population growth effect and the investment effect, even though the latter effect decreases
slightly at the end of the period. This suggests that the role of the two traditional factors
associated with capital deepening increased since 1960. For example, in the end of the sample
— for example the 1980–1998 window — our estimates of the population growth effect is more
that 3 times as much as it was in the 1960–1978 period. Likewise, the coefficient of the investment
rate is multiplied by about 2.5 over the same period. Furthermore, the size of the coefficients
over the different windows is relatively robust to the estimation method and to whether or no
we control for educational investment.
In order to examine the statistical significance of this increase, Table 2 reports a series of OLS
and IV estimates for the regression of the average yearly growth of output per worker on the
initial log-level of output per worker, the average yearly growth in labor force, the log of the
average rate of investment and our measure of education investment. Estimates are reported
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for both the first (1960–1978) and last (1980–1998) window of our sample. Averages for both
the regressors and regressants are taken over the respective windows. Let us focus on our
Table 2: Growth regressions
OLS IV1 OLS IV2
60–78 80–98 60–78 80–98 60–78 80–98 60–78 80–98
const. 0.185 0.203 0.149 0.199 0.218 0.203 0.197 0.227
( 0.025) ( 0.026) ( 0.027) ( 0.027) ( 0.032) ( 0.036) ( 0.036) ( 0.046)
y0 -0.013 -0.013 -0.011 -0.013 -0.017 -0.013 -0.015 -0.015
( 0.002) ( 0.002) ( 0.002) ( 0.002) ( 0.003) ( 0.003) ( 0.003) ( 0.004)
n -0.137 -0.730 -0.203 -0.773 -0.082 -0.830 -0.117 -0.830
( 0.164) ( 0.152) ( 0.172) ( 0.156) ( 0.164) ( 0.149) ( 0.171) ( 0.153)
i/y 0.016 0.025 0.009 0.024 0.014 0.028 0.006 0.027
( 0.003) ( 0.004) ( 0.004) ( 0.004) ( 0.003) ( 0.004) ( 0.004) ( 0.005)
Educ. – – – – 0.010 -0.007 0.015 0.002
( 0.006) ( 0.009) ( 0.008) ( 0.014)
R2 0.36 0.54 – – 0.37 0.59 – –
Q(Total) 16.436 [0.001] 19.142 [0.000] 26.670 [0.000] 28.502 [0.000]
Q(y0) 0.005 [0.943] 0.743 [0.389] 0.759 [0.384] 0.000 [0.989]
Q(n, i/y) 13.605 [0.001] 17.332 [0.000] 21.997 [0.000] 21.430 [0.000]
Q(Educ.) – – – – 2.668 [0.102] 0.686 [0.407]
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis, p–values in brackets. IV1: the variables used in instrument i/y and n are
the initial level of (i/y), the average (c/y) over the sub–sample, and the average growth rate of population over
the 15 first periods of the sub–sample. 75 observations. IV2: the set of instruments is that of IV1 completed by
the years of schooling to instrument Educ. 68 observations.
benchmark regression. Note first that the convergence parameter has remained stable over the
two windows. Indeed, the stability test of this parameter, which we denote by Q(y0) in the
table, does not indicate a rejection of stability at conventional 5% level, whatever the estimation
method (p–value=0.943 using OLS, 0.389 using IV).22 Conversely, the estimates reported in the
four first columns of Table 2 clearly show that the magnitude of the population growth and
investment/output ratio effects increased quite dramatically between the 1960–1978 and 1980–
1998 periods. In particular, over the first sub–period (1960–1978), the coefficient measuring the
impact of population growth on the growth process was insignificant at the conventional 5%
level whatever the estimation method. For example, when the benchmark equation is estimated
by IV, this coefficient amounted to -0.203, implying that a negative 1% differential in adult-
population growth in 1960 would have been translated into a positive differential in output per
worker of about 4% by 1978. In the second sub–period, this coefficient became significant and
rose to -0.773, implying the same negative 1% differential in the rate of growth would have been
translated in a positive differential in output per worker of about 14% by 1998 relative to 1978. A
22Note that all our stability tests are performed allowing for residuals to be correlated within countries over
the two samples and for the variances to differ.
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similar pattern is found in the behavior of the coefficient affecting the investment/output ratio.
Over the first window, the IV coefficient affecting investment was significant and amounted
to 0.009. It rose to 0.024 over the 1980–1998 window. Note that Q(n, i/y) , the test statistic
associated with the null hypothesis of stability in these parameters across these windows strongly
leads to rejection of the null of stability (p–value=0.000) for both methods. The test of the overall
stability of all three coefficients (Q(Total)) is also clearly rejected.
The introduction of education in the regression does not alter our previous findings. In fact,
these are even reinforced. Indeed, if we consider the results obtained through IV estimation, the
coefficient affecting labor force growth is now multiplied by a factor of about 7 between the two
windows shifting from -0.117 over the 1960–1978 window to -0.830 over the 1980–1998 window.
A very similar pattern is found for the investment rate whose coefficient is multiplied by 4.5
between the two windows. Accordingly, the joint stability of the factors associated with capital
accumulation is again strongly rejected by the data (p–value=0.000). It should be noted that we
tested and could not reject the hypothesis that the increased importance of the investment rate
was the same as the increased importance of the effect of labor force growth. This is precisely
what would be expected if the forces emphasized in our theoretical model were present.
We now want to go one step further and follow recent work of Bernanke and Gu¨rkaynak [2001]
who examined whether total factor productivity growth across countries is exogenous with re-
spect to a country’s accumulation path, or whether conversely, a country’s accumulation affects
TFP growth over certain periods, thereby suggesting some form of endogenous productivity
gains. In effect, our model suggests that not only we should see a rise in the importance of cap-
ital accumulation forces on output–per–worker over the process of globalization, but we should
also see this relation emerged for measured productivity. To address this issue, we build TFP
series for each country by subtracting from output–per–worker growth the share weighted con-
tribution of physical capital–per–worker growth. Since we do not have good share data for all
these countries, we build TFP series using a share of capital of 0.35 — which is close to the
average share of capital across–countries.23 Capital series are constructed using the perpetual
inventory method.24 Table 3 reports a series of OLS and IV estimates for the regression of the
average yearly growth of TFP on its initial level, the average yearly growth of the labor force, the
log of the average rate of investment and our measure of education investment. Estimates are
reported for both the 1960–1978 and 1980–1998 window. When IV regressions are considered,
the set of instrument is IV? (completed with years of schooling when education is introduced).
23In Beaudry et al. [2002], we have assessed the robustness of these results considering a share of capital of 0.5,
which is close to the highest capital shares reported in Bernanke and Gu¨rkaynak [2001]. The results are indeed
very similar.
24Details of this construction are given in appendix A.
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Table 3: TFP regressions
OLS IV1 OLS IV2
60–78 80–98 60–78 80–98 60–78 80–98 60–78 80–98
const. 0.118 0.107 0.111 0.110 0.135 0.098 0.142 0.109
( 0.016) ( 0.020) ( 0.017) ( 0.021) ( 0.020) ( 0.027) ( 0.023) ( 0.033)
TFP0 -0.014 -0.011 -0.014 -0.012 -0.017 -0.009 -0.019 -0.011
( 0.003) ( 0.003) ( 0.003) ( 0.003) ( 0.004) ( 0.004) ( 0.004) ( 0.005)
n -0.073 -0.597 -0.122 -0.616 0.001 -0.684 -0.010 -0.678
( 0.125) ( 0.122) ( 0.128) ( 0.124) ( 0.125) ( 0.124) ( 0.130) ( 0.130)
i/y 0.009 0.012 0.005 0.012 0.006 0.015 0.001 0.015
( 0.002) ( 0.003) ( 0.002) ( 0.003) ( 0.003) ( 0.003) ( 0.004) ( 0.004)
Educ. – – – – 0.007 -0.007 0.013 -0.005
( 0.004) ( 0.007) ( 0.006) ( 0.011)
R2 0.38 0.45 – – 0.38 0.51 – –
Q(Total) 11.885 [0.009] 14.505 [0.002] 20.673 [0.000] 22.893 [0.000]
Q(TFP0) 0.415 [0.519] 0.262 [0.609] 2.076 [0.150] 1.653 [0.199]
Q(n, i/y) 11.130 [0.004] 13.692 [0.001] 19.235 [0.000] 17.369 [0.000]
Q(Educ.) – – – – 2.825 [0.093] 1.806 [0.179]
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis, p–values in brackets. IV1: the variables used in instrument i/y and n are
the initial level of (i/y), the average (c/y) over the sub–sample, and the average growth rate of population over
the 15 first periods of the sub–sample. 75 observations. IV2: the set of instruments is that of IV1 completed by
the years of schooling to instrument Educ. 68 observations.
The results presented in Table 3 are intriguingly in lines of those obtained using output–per–
worker. If we first focus on the benchmark regression, it appears that the coefficient related to
initial TFP over each window is found to be significant and negative, whatever the window and
the estimation method. This indicates that there has probably been technological catch–up over
each period. But, this catch–up parameter remained stable over the two windows. The stability
test of this parameter (Q(TFP0)) in the table does not indicate a rejection at a conventional 5%
level, whatever the estimation method (p–value=0.519 using OLS, 0.609 using IV). Conversely,
the estimates of the population growth and investment/output ratio effects clearly indicate that
they increased substantially between the 1960–1978 and 1980–1998 periods. For example, in
the first sub-period (1960–1978), the coefficient measuring the impact of population growth on
the growth process was not significant at the conventional 5% level whatever the estimation
method and amounted to -0.073 with OLS and -0.122 with IV estimation. In the last window,
this coefficient became significant and rose to, respectively, -0.597 and -0.616. Similarly, over
the first window, the IV coefficient affecting investment amounted to 0.005 (0.009 with OLS)
and rose to 0.012 (0.012 with OLS) over the 1980–1998 window. Accordingly, the stability test
of these parameters (Q(n, i/y)) across the two windows strongly leads to a rejection of the null
of stability (p–value=0.000) for both methods. The test of the overall stability of all three
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coefficients (Q(Total)) is also clearly rejected.
Just as in the case of output–per–worker, the introduction of education in the regression strength-
ens our results. For example, if we focus on the IV estimates, it appears that the coefficient
affecting labor force growth has increased enormously (from -0.010 over the 1960–1978 window
to -0.678 over the 1980–1998 window). Likewise, the investment ratio effect is hugely increased
between the two windows. Accordingly, the joint stability of the traditional growth factors
across the two windows is strongly rejected by the data (p–value=0.000). The results reported
in Table 3 therefore provide support to the model’s prediction that over a period of globalization,
countries’s with high propensities to accumulate capital should exhibit above average produc-
tivity growth. In order to illustrate the extent to which the observed increase in the importance
Figure 8: Counterfactual Distribution
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of capital accumulation forces may be relevant for understanding the observed change in the
cross-country distribution of output–per–worker, in Figure 8 we overlay the actual distribution
observed in 1998 and 1960 with a counterfactual distribution designed to control for the ob-
served increase in the regression parameters associated with the investment rate and the growth
of labor force over the period 1978–1998 relative to the period 1960–1978. More precisely, we
create the counterfactual distribution of (log) output–per–worker, denoted yc98 as follows:
25
yci,98 = y
78
i,78 + (β1 − β2)Xi,98
where Xi,98 are the values of the investment rate and the labor force growth for country i over
25Greater details on the construction of the counterfactual distribution can be found in BCG.
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the period 78–98, β1 is the estimated effect of these two variables over the period 1960–1978
and β2 is the estimated effect over the period 1978–1998. We can see from the figure that the
estimated changes in the β’s can account for all the hollowing of the distribution. This indicates
that the observed changes in the the role of capital accumulation forces are of the right order
to explain the observed change in the distribution, thereby providing support for the central
mechanism of the model.
4.2 Looking for a more direct link with trade
Up to now, our empirical evidence has focused on highlighting changes in the growth process
that have arisen during a period where there has been a substantial increase in international
trade. However, in itself, this does not imply that the change in the growth process is related
to globalization. It only supports the theoretical possibility presented in the model. One way
to address this issue more directly is to look at whether the change in the increased importance
of capital for growth is more pronounced among countries where the process of globalization
is most apparent. To this end, we now divide our sample into two sub–samples according to
their growth of international trade, where the growth of international trade is measured by
the change in the ratio of exports plus imports to GDP (this is the openness measure in the
World Penn Tables). The first sample (∆OP <Median(∆)) is the set of countries where the
growth in international trade between 1960 and 1998 is below the median growth rate of the
entire sample. The second sample (∆OP >Median(∆)) is comprised of countries with growth in
international trade above the median. For each of the sub–samples, we once again run a set of
20 rolling regressions over 19 years windows starting in the 1960. Figure 9 plots the coefficients
Figure 9: Rolling Regressions: Openness
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(on the same scale) on our accumulation variable (K) for the whole sample and the two sub–
Globalization, Gains from Specialization and the World Distribution of Output 32
samples. In each case, we plot four series of coefficients corresponding to different estimation
techniques and different control variables. The initial value of output–per–worker is included in
each regression. The differences between the series correspond to whether or not we included
education as an additional regressor and whether we estimate by instrumental variables (using
the same instruments as discussed previously) or by OLS. To help judge statistical significance,
Table 4 reports the point estimates associated with the first and last window for the base case,
where the estimation is by OLS and where we do not include an education control. What is
Table 4: Openness (OLS)
Total ∆OP <med(∆OP ) ∆OP >med(∆OP )
60–78 80–98 60–78 80–98 60–78 80–98
Const. 0.147 0.126 0.094 0.150 0.165 0.092
( 0.022) ( 0.023) ( 0.029) ( 0.033) ( 0.034) ( 0.029)
y0 -0.014 -0.014 -0.009 -0.017 -0.016 -0.012
( 0.003) ( 0.002) ( 0.003) ( 0.004) ( 0.004) ( 0.003)
K 0.016 0.031 0.014 0.027 0.014 0.041
( 0.003) ( 0.003) ( 0.003) ( 0.005) ( 0.005) ( 0.006)
R2 0.34 0.55 0.33 0.49 0.31 0.61
Q(K) 13.006 [0.000] 4.103 [0.043] 16.399 [0.000]
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis, p–values in brackets. 75 observations.
clear from Figure 9 is that the increased importance of physical capital for growth documented
previously appears to arise most prominently among the countries which have witnessed the
greatest increase in international trade. This is very much in line with the spirit of our model.
In effect, for the countries with a high growth in international trade, the effects of capital
intensity, as measured by K, appear to have tripled or quadrupled, which is huge. For instance,
as shown in the last row of Table 4, the change in importance of physical capital for growth
is significant across the two sub–periods for both samples. The coefficient on K doubled —
increasing from 0.014 to 0.027 — for the economies where the process of globalization was less
apparent, while the increase was more substantial among the economies that experience more
growth in trade — increasing from 0.014 to 0.041. Even though these last results, in conjunction
with our previous ones, still cannot unambiguously confirm causality running from globalization
to changes in the world distribution, we believe that they provide considerable support for the
idea and mechanism presented in our model.
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5 Discussion
In this section we briefly discuss two extensions of our model. Our goal is to illustrate that our
theoretical results our robust to changes in some of our simplifying assumptions. In particular,
we will show that the results are robust to allowing both types of goods to be produced by means
of both capital and labor, while maintaining that the type 2 good is more capital intensive. We
also show that allowing for international capital flows does not invalidate our results, in fact
they accentuate them.
Let us first extend our model to the case where capital is used in the two sectors. The Z1 good is
now produced using intermediate goodsM1 and capital K according to the production function:
Z1,i,t = A1(K1,i,t)
α1M1−α11,i,t (22)
where M1 is a composite of intermediate goods Qi,t(`), such that
M1,i,t =
(∫ 1
0
Q1,i,t(`)
ρd`
) 1
ρ
with ρ < 1 (23)
The Z2 good is assumed to be produced using intermediate goods and capital according to:
Z2,i,t = A2((K2,i,t)
α2M1−α22,i,t (24)
where α2 > α1, indicating that sector 2 is more capital intensive than sector 1, and M2 is
composed by the following quality weighted sum26 of intermediate goods Qi,t(`).
M2,i,t =
(∫ 1
0
(
θ si,t(`)Q2,i,t(`)
)ρ
d`
) 1
ρ
with ρ < 1 (25)
In (25), θ si,t(`), ` ∈ (0, 1), denotes the subjective quality assigned by the firm in sector 2 to the
intermediate good Qi,t(`) sold by firm `.
Given the demand from both sector 1 and 2, the problem of firm ` ∈ (0, 1) can be seen as
maximizing profits by choosing prices and allocating labor to production directed to the different
sectors. Denoting by σi,t(`) ∈ [0, 1], the share of total labor, Li,t, allocated to the production of
good 1, the program of an intermediate firm is given by
max
{Li,t(`),p1,i,t(`),p2,i,t(`),σi,t(`)}
p1,i,t(`)Γtσi,t(`)Li,t(`)+ p2,i,t(`)Γt(1−σi,t(`))Li,t(`)−Wi,tLi,t(`) (26)
taking the form of the demand into account.
26Note that the index of intermediate goods is characterized by the same elasticity in the two sectors. This
restriction can be relaxed without any difficulty. This would only complicate the analysis by multiplying sub–cases
without altering much the results.
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As before, an economy can choose to fully specialize in the production of type 1 good, to fully
specialize in the production of type 2 good, or allocate its inputs in both sector to produce both
type of goods. We show in the next proposition that our main result regarding the emergence
of a local convexity survives this extension.
Proposition 9 (Local convexity) If 0 6 ε < (α2−α1)
2
α2(1−α2)(1−α1)
, then, under free trade, output–per–
worker displays local convexity.
Proposition 9 states that, as long as  is positive (and not too large) the production function
displays a local convexity stemming from the productivity effects of specialization. In particular,
when there exist gains to specialization, ε > 0, the economy (i) can avoid decreasing returns
by specializing in the production of type 2 good, and (ii) becomes more productive. Therefore,
any change in the accumulation behavior exerts a larger effect on output–per–worker, implying
that the model supports the emergence of a twin peaked distribution of output–per–worker.
One may also be concerned with the fact that, in our model, the world economy consists of a
collection of economies that do not trade in capital markets. How do our explanation to the
twin–peaks phenomenon survive the introduction of international capital flows? In fact, if we
Figure 10: Perfect capital mobility
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Note: The line ∆(q) corresponds to the total input cost at market prices. For instance,
∆(q) = w2 + q.k, where w2 corresponds to the wage when the economy fully specializes in
the production of a type 2 good.
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now take international capital flows into account, the forces favoring polarization are actually
reinforced. Indeed, when capital is perfectly mobile across countries, perfect competition on the
capital market forces real returns to capital to be equalized across country. Then, as illustrated
in Figure 10, the distribution of output–per–worker must collapse to two mass points (kft1 and
kft2 ) as either countries specialize in the production of type 1 good for which capital is not used
(kft1 ), or specialize in the production of type 2 good (k
ft
2 ).
27 Hence, the opening up of both
trade and international capital markets in the presence of gains to specialization would give rise
to an extreme version of the twin–peaks phenomenon.
6 Concluding remarks
Over the last forty years, the distribution of output–per–worker across countries has hollowed–
out substantially. Two major classes of explanation can be proposed for such a phenomenon.
First, it may be the case that the distribution of the exogenous forces that drive the dynamics of
output–per–worker has changed over time to yield a bi–modality in the distribution of output–
per–worker. Second, it may be that the relationship between these exogenous forces and output–
per–worker has changed. In this paper, we presented theory and evidence in support of an
explanation of the second type. In particular, we developed a simple dynamic general equilibrium
multi–country model where, in the absence of international trade, each economy evolves like in
the Solow growth model. However, in the presence of free trade, conforming with the empirical
evidence, countries polarize in a manner influenced by their propensity to accumulate physical
capital. The main element of the model which drives the result is the presence of productivity
gains to specialization. We showed how this effect of specialization induces, under free trade,
a local convexity that causes the distribution of output–per–worker across countries to hollow–
out in the middle and loose its original uni–modal shape. Although we did not presented an
organization theoretic explanation to the form of the firm level gains to specialization used in
the model, we believe that our analysis highlights the potential of this approach to give new
insight for understanding how the world economy is being affected by globalization.
27There exists another point of tangency for a ∆(q) line in the convex part of the production function. However,
this steady state is unstable.
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— Appendix —
A Data
Two datasets are used in this study. Most of the data are taken from the latest version of the Penn World
Table 6.0 downloadable from:
http://webhost.bridgew.edu/baten/
Education data are taken from the Barro and Lee [1993] dataset, which is downloadable from:
http://www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/Economics/Growth/datasets.htm
A.1 Main data
Our measure of income, y, is the logarithm of real GDP chain per worker (RGDPW in PWT 6.0), where
the definition of a worker is based on the economically active population.
Population is POP in PWT 6.0. Workers are computed as the population from 15 to 64 obtained from
POPWt =
real GDP chain per capita
real GDP chain per worker
× population =
RGDPL
RGDPW
× POP
n then denotes the rate of growth of the 15–64 population.
The corresponding annualized average rate of growth for the variable Z within the sub–sample [t;t+n] is
computed as
∆z =
log(Zt+n)− log(Zt)
n
The share of consumption at constant prices corresponds to the variable KC in the PWT 6.0. In the IV
procedure, the average share of consumption c/y over the sub–sample [t;t+n] is computed as
1
n
n∑
j=1
log(KCt+j/100)
The investment ratio at constant prices corresponds to the variable KI in the PWT 6.0 and is divided by
100. In the regressions, i/y then refers to the logarithm of this variable. It is also used to compute our
accumulation variable that accounts for the overall accumulation effect, which is given by
K ≡ log
(
KI
(1 + γ)(1 + n) + δ − 1
)
We follow Mankiw et al. [1992] and assume an annual depreciation rate of δ = 0.03 and a rate of growth
of technical progress, γ, of 2%.28
Further, the investment share is used to compute the capital stock per worker — needed to compute the
TFP — using the permanent inventory scheme
(1 + n)kt+1 = it + (1− δ)kt
28We performed robustness checks but did not find any significant effect of a change in either δ or γ.
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where k = K/L. k1960 is obtained as
k1960 =
(
1
10
1970∑
t=1960
KIt
)
RGDPW1960
(1 + n60−70)(1 + γ) + δ − 1
where
n60−70 ≡
log(POPW1970)− log(POPW1960)
10
The measure of TFP then iss
TFP = log(RGDPW)− α log(k)
where α is set to 0.35 and 0.5 to check robustness.
A.2 Education data
The education variables are borrowed from Barro and Lee [1993]. We consider essentially 3 measures of
human capital. The first one is related to the overall enrollment rate in education. Assuming that, on
average, most people sped 6 years in primary schooling, 6 years in secondary schooling and 4 years in
higher schooling, we first define the index
log
(
6× P+ 6× S+ 4× H
16
)
where P, S and H respectively denote the total gross enrollment ratio for, respectively, primary, secondary
and higher schooling.
Our last education variable, Years, should be more understood as a stock since it is given by
log(HUMAN)
where HUMAN is the average schooling years in the total population over 25.
Note that these measures are only reported every 5 years in the database from 1960 to 1985. We actually
used an average of years 1960 and 1965 for the first sub–sample and 1975 and 1980 for the second
sub–sample. We restrict ourselves to 2 periods for the average for data availability purposes.
A.3 Composition of the sample
Our restricted sample of 75 countries consists of:
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Brazil, Barbados, Botswana, Canada,
Switzerland, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador,
Egypt, Spain, Finland, Fiji, France, United Kingdom, Greece, Guatemala, Guyana, Hong Kong, Hon-
duras, Indonesia, India, Ireland, Iran, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Jordan, Japan, Republic of Korea,
Sri Lanka, Lesotho, Luxembourg, Morocco, Mexico, Mozambique, Malaysia, Namibia, Nicaragua, Nether-
lands, Norway, Nepal, New Zealand, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Papua New Guinea, Portugal,
Paraguay, Romania, Singapore, El Salvador, Sweden, Syria, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia,
Turkey, Taiwan, Uruguay, USA, Venezuela, South Africa,
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B Proof of Propositions
In this section we will abstract from any reference to the index of the economy, except when strictly
necessary, in order to save on notation.
Proposition 1 In the absence of trade, the problem the final good producer has to solve is
max
Kt,Qjt(`);j=1,2,`∈(0,1)
Yt − qtKt −
∫ 1
0
(pq1t(`)Q1t(`) + p
q
2t(`)Q2t(`)) d`
which yields the following set of first order conditions
qt = α(1− ϕ)
Yt
Kt
(27)
pq1t(`) = ϕYtQ1t(`)
ρ−1M−ρ1t (28)
pq2t(`) = (1− ϕ)(1− α)Ytθ
s
t(`)
ρQ2t(`)
ρ−1M−ρ2t (29)
The intermediate firm then maximizes
max
{Lt>0,σt(`)∈[0,1]}
pq1t(`)σt(`)ΓtLt(`) + p
q
2t(`)(1− σt(`))ΓtLt(`)−WtLt(`) (30)
subject to (28) and (29). The set of first order conditions is then given by
Wt = ρϕYt
Q1t(`)
ρ
Lt(`)
M −ρ1t + ρ(1− ϕ)(1− α)Ytθ
s
t(`)
ρQ2t(`)
ρ
Lt(`)
M−ρ2t (31)
ρϕYt
Q1t(`)
ρ
σt(`)
M −ρ1t = ρ(1− ϕ)(1− α)Ytθ
s
t(`)
ρ Q2t(`)
ρ
1− σt(`)
M−ρ2t (32)
In a symmetric equilibrium, we have
σt(`) = σt Lt(`) = Lt
Q1t(`) = Q1t Q2t(`) = Q2t
Furthermore, rational expectations and symmetric equilibrium imply that θst(`) = θt(`) = θt, such that
M1t = Q1t = σtΓtLt and M2t = θtQ2t = θt(1− σt)ΓtLt. Hence, the labor allocation choice becomes
ρϕYtσ
ρ−1
t (ΓtLt)
ρ(σtΓtLt)
−ρ = ρ(1− ϕ)(1− α)Ytθ
ρ
t (1− σt)
ρ−1(ΓtLt)
ρ(θt(1− σt)ΓtLt)
−ρ
such that
σt = σ
? ≡
ϕ
ϕ+ (1− α)(1− ϕ)
Note that θt then reduces to θt = θ(1 − σ
?)ε = 1 since θ = (1− σ?)−ε. Plugging the optimal allocation
of labor in the definition of total output, we get
Yt = A
1−ϕσ?ϕ(1− σ?)(1−ϕ)(1−α)K
α(1−ϕ)
t (ΓtLt)
ϕ+(1−ϕ)(1−α)
Henceforth, output per efficient worker can be written as
yt = A
1−ϕσ?ϕ(1− σ?)(1−ϕ)(1−α)k
α(1−ϕ)
t = Bk
α(1−ϕ)
t
where B ≡ A1−ϕσ?ϕ(1− σ?)(1−ϕ)(1−α)
Hence the dynamics of the economy — in intensive form — may be summarized by
(1 + γ)(1 + n)kt+1 = sBk
α(1−ϕ)
t + (1− δ)kt
which admits
k? =
(
sB
(1 + γ)(1 + n) + δ − 1
) 1
1−α(1−ϕ)
as steady state.
q.e.d 2
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Proposition 2 Let us recall that the steady state value of the capital stock in country i is given by
k?i =
(
siB
(1 + γ)(1 + n) + δ − 1
) 1
1−α(1−ϕ)
such that the steady state level of output can be written as
y?i =
(
si
(1 + γ)(1 + n) + δ − 1
) α(1−ϕ)
1−α(1−ϕ)
B
1
α(1−ϕ)
or in logarithm
log(y?i ) =
α(1− ϕ)
1− α(1− ϕ)
log
(
si
(1 + γ)(1 + n) + δ − 1
)
+
1
α(1− ϕ)
log(B)
or
log(y?i ) =
α(1− ϕ)
1− α(1− ϕ)
νi +
1
α(1− ϕ)
log(B)
Therefore, the deviation from the median level is given by
ŷi =
α(1− ϕ)
1− α(1− ϕ)
(νi − ν
m) = g(νi − ν
m)
Making use of the change of variable formula, and denoting by µν(·) the distribution of ν, we have
µ(ŷ) =
µν(g−1(y))
g′(g−1(y))
Since g(·) takes the simple linear form g(ν) = ν/ψ with ψ = α(1− ϕ)/(1− α(1− ϕ)), it follows that
µ(ŷ) = ψµν(ψy + νm)
which can be restated as
µ(ŷ) = ψµν̂(ψy)
q.e.d 2
Lemma 1 In the small open economy, each firm takes the price of goods as given, such that it solves
max
Kt,Qjt(`);j=1,2,`∈(0,1)
Z1t + ptZ2t − qtKt −
∫ 1
0
(pq1t(`)Q1t(`) + p
q
2t(`)Q2t(`)) d`
which yields the following set of first order conditions
qt = ptα
Z2t
Kt
(33)
pq1t(`) = ΓtQ1t(`)
ρ−1M1−ρ1t (34)
pq2t(`) = (1− α)ptθ
s
t(`)
ρQ2t(`)
ρ−1AKαt Γ
1−α
t M
1−α−ρ
2t (35)
The intermediate firm then maximizes
max
{Lt>0,σt(`)∈[0,1]}
pq1t(`)σt(`)ΓtLt(`) + p
q
2t(`)(1− σt(`))ΓtLt(`)−WtLt(`) (36)
subject to (34) and (35). The set of first order conditions is then given by
Wt = ρ
Q1t(`)
ρ
Lt(`)
M1−ρ1t + ρ(1− α)ptθ
s
t(`)
ρQ2t(`)
ρ
Lt(`)
AKαt Γ
1−α
t M
1−α−ρ
2t (37)
ρ
Q1t(`)
ρ
σt(`)
M−ρ1t 6 ρ(1− α)ptθst(`)ρ
Q2t(`)
ρ
1− σt(`)
AKαt Γ
1−α
t M
1−α−ρ
2t (38)
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In a symmetric equilibrium, we have
σt(`) = σt Lt(`) = Lt
Q1t(`) = Q1t Q2t(`) = Q2t
Furthermore, rational expectations and symmetric equilibrium imply that θst(`) = θt(`) = θt, such that
M1t = Q1t = σtΓtLt and M2t = θtQ2t = θt(1− σt)ΓtLt. Hence, the labor allocation choice becomes
ρσρ−1t (ΓtLt)
ρ(σtΓtLt)
1−ρ 6 ρ(1− α)ptθρt (1− σt)ρ−1(ΓtLt)ρAKαt (θt(1− σt)ΓtLt)1−α−ρ
or
ρΓtLt 6 ρ(1− α)ptAKαt Γ1−αt θ1−αt (1− σt)−αL1−αt
which rewrites
1 6 (1− α)ptAkαt θ1−αt (1− σt)−α
Taking the definition of θt into account (θt = θ(1− σt)
ε), it should be clear that the economy specializes
in the production of good 2, σt = 0, as soon as
kt > k˜(pt) ≡
(
(1− α)Aθ
1−α
pt
)− 1
α
Noting that θ = (1− σ?)−ε, we can calculate the the effect of ε on k˜(pt) as
∂k˜(pt)
∂ε
=
1− α
α
(
(1− α)Aθ
1−α
pt
)− 1
α
log(1− σ?) < 0
To prove the second component of the proposition, note that in the limit, we have
θ =
(
ϕ+ (1− α)(1− ϕ)
(1− α)(1− ϕ)
) α
1−α
= (1− σ?)−
α
1−α
Therefore
k˜(p) = [(1− α)pA]−1/α(1− σ?)
From the program of the final good producer in the median economy, we have
p =
1− ϕ
ϕ
z1
z2
=
1− ϕ
ϕ
σ?
A(1− σ?)1−αk?α
Plugging this result in the former equation, we get
k˜(p) =
[
(1− α)
1− ϕ
ϕ
σ?
A(1− σ?)1−αk?α
A
]−1/α
(1− σ?)
by definition of σ?, this rewrites
k˜(p) =
[
1− σ?
σ?
σ?
A(1− σ?)1−αk?α
A
]−1/α
(1− σ?)
which simplifies to
k˜(p) = k?
q.e.d 2
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Proposition 3 We have to study two cases:
k 6 k˜(p) : In such a case, σ > 0, so that the first order condition holds with equality and
(1− α)pAkαθ
1−α
(1− σ)ε(1−α)−α = 1
from which we get
σ = 1−
[
(1− α)pAθ
1−α
] 1
α−ε(1−α)
k
α
α−ε(1−α)
Since z1 = σ and z2 = Ak
α(θ(1− σ)(1+ε))1−α in the long–run, and given that pyy = z1 + pz2, we
have
pyy = 1−
[
(1− α)pAθ
1−α
] 1
α−ε(1−α)
k
α
α−ε(1−α)
+pAkα
(
θ
([
(1− α)pAθ
1−α
] 1
α−ε(1−α)
k
α
α−ε(1−α)
)(1+ε))1−α
This reduces to
pyy = 1 +
α
1− α
[
A(1− α)θ
1−α
p
] 1
α−ε(1−α)
k
α
α−ε(1−α)
Finally, note that from the final good producer, we get py = p
1−ϕ/Φ where Φ ≡ (Φ). Plugging this
result in this equation, we get
y = Φpϕ−1
[
1 +
α
1− α
[
A(1− α)θ
1−α
p
] 1
α−ε(1−α)
k
α
α−ε(1−α)
]
Note that
∂y
∂k
=
α
α− ε(1− α)
Φpϕ−1
[
α
1− α
[
A(1− α)θ
1−α
p
] 1
α−ε(1−α)
k
α
α−ε(1−α)
−1
]
such that y is increasing in k iff ε < α1−α . Furthermore
∂2y
∂k2
=
(
α
α− ε(1− α)
− 1
)
1
k
∂y
∂k
> 0
as long as ε < α1−α , therefore creating local convexities.
k > k˜(p) : In such a case, σt = 0, so that the long–run production function reduces to
pyy = pz2 = pAk
αθ
1−α
Plugging the definition of py in the last equation, we get
y = ΦpϕAθ
1−α
kα
Let us now prove the second part of the proposition. First note that
∂ya
∂k
∣∣∣∣
k=k?
= α(1− ϕ)Bk?α(1−ϕ)−1
Likewise, let us recall that
∂yft
∂k
=
α
α− ε(1− α)
Φpϕ−1
[
α
1− α
[
A(1− α)θ
1−α
p
] 1
α−ε(1−α)
k
α
α−ε(1−α)
−1
]
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We know that
p =
1− ϕ
ϕ
z1
z2
such that
p
∣∣
k=k?
=
1− ϕ
ϕ
σ?
A(1− σ?)1−αk?α
Plugging this in the derivative, and remembering that
θ = (1− σ?)−ε,Φ = ϕϕ(1− ϕ)1−ϕ and
σ?
1− σ?
=
ϕ
(1− α)(1− ϕ)
we get
∂yft
∂k
∣∣∣∣
k=k?
=
α
α− ε(1− α)
α(1− ϕ)σ?ϕ(1− σ?)(1−α)(1−ϕ)A1−ϕk?α(1−ϕ)−1
Let us now recall that by definition of B, we have B ≡ σ?ϕ(1 − σ?)(1−α)(1−ϕ)A1−ϕ, such that the last
equation rewrites:
∂yft
∂k
∣∣∣∣
k=k?
=
α
α− ε(1− α)
Bk?α(1−ϕ)−1 =
α
α− ε(1− α)
∂ya
∂k
∣∣∣∣
k=k?
Since ε > 0, it follows that
∂yft
∂k
∣∣∣∣
k=k?
> ∂y
a
∂k
∣∣∣∣
k=k?
q.e.d 2
Proposition 4 Let us recall that the steady of any of the small open economies we consider can be
characterized by
τk = sy
where τ = ((1 + γ)(1 + n) + δ − 1) and where y is defined by proposition 3. Therefore, we can define
the steady state function ϑ(k) = y/k, which at each τ/s associates one or several steady states. This
function takes the form
ϑ(k) =
{
Φ
k p
ϕ−1
(
1 + α1−α (A(1− α)θ
1−α
p)
1
α−ε(1−α) k
α
α−ε(1−α)
)
for k 6 k˜(p)
Φ
k p
ϕAθ
1−α
kα−1 for k > k˜(p)
Uniqueness of the steady state then corresponds to the fact that this function is bijective over the whole
interval. A necessary condition for bijection is that the function is monotonic. As can be seen from the
definition of the ϑ(k), it is monotonically decreasing for k > k˜(p) since α ∈ (0, 1). Therefore, monotonicity
requires the function to be decreasing for values of the capital labor ratio k ∈ (0, k˜(p)]. Over the latter
interval,
ϑ′(k) =
Φpϕ−1
k2
[
ε(1− α)
α− ε(1− α)
α
1− α
(
A(1− α)θ
1−α
p
) 1
α−ε(1−α)
k
α
α−ε(1−α) − 1
]
such that
ϑ′(k) T 0⇐⇒ k T k̂ ≡
(
α− ε(1− α)
αε
)α−ε(1−α)
α (
A(1− α)θ
1−α
p
)− 1
α
= ςk˜(p)
where ς ≡
(
α−ε(1−α)
αε
)α−ε(1−α)
α
. As long as 0 < ε < α, ς is greater than one, such that ϑ′(k) < 0 over
(0, k˜(p)). Therefore the function is monotonic and the economy admits a unique steady state.
q.e.d 2
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Proposition 5 First of all, let us recall that the steady state of the model economy is defined by
((1 + n)(1 + γ)− (1− δ))k = sy or equivalently ν =
k
y
where y is given in proposition 3. From the definition of y, we can straightforwardly express ν as a
function of y as
ν =

g1(y) ≡
Ψ(p)
y
(
y − Φpϕ−1
)α−ε(1−α)
α if y 6 y˜(p)
g2(y) ≡
[
ΦpϕAθ
1−α
]− 1
α
y
1−α
α if y < y˜(p)
where Ψ(p) ≡
(
1−α
α
)α−ε(1−α)
α
(
A(1− α)θ
1−α
p
)− 1
α
, and y˜(p) is obtained by plugging the definition of k˜(p)
into the production function, implying
y˜(p) =
Φpϕ−1
1− α
The standard change of variable formula states that, for any random variable continuous X with density
functionµX and for any one–to–one function Φ : S ⊂ R −→ R, such that Φ
′(.) exists and does not vanish
on S, the random variable Z = Φ(X) is continuous with density function given by
µZ(Z) = µX(Φ
−1(Z)) |Φ−1
′
(Z)|
Since, as long as 0 < ε < α, the production function is one–to–one (see proposition 4), we can apply the
preceding result to our economy. Therefore, let us assume that the saving rate is distributed according
to the density function µs(s), the distribution of income can be obtained applying the previous formula.
Noting that
∣∣∣∣∂ν∂y
∣∣∣∣ =

g1(y)×
[
αΦpϕ−1 − ε(1− α)y
αy(y − Φpϕ−1)
]
if y 6 y˜(p)
1− α
α
×
g2(y)
y
if y > y˜(p)
The result then follows.
q.e.d 2
Proposition 6 In order to prove the first part of the proposition, we refer explicitly to section 1.2. For
the density to reduce at the median of the distribution — in the absence of a change in the distribution
of ν — it must be the case that the marginal effect of ν on y evaluated at the median ν must increase:
∂yft
∂ν
∣∣∣∣
ν=νm
> ∂y
a
∂ν
∣∣∣∣
ν=νm
if 0 <  < α
where ft and a denote respectively free trade and autarky. Let us first compute ∂y
a
∂ν
∣∣∣∣
ν=νm
. Since
ya
∣∣
ν=νm
= Bk?α(1−ϕ)
and given that ν = k?/y?, we have
ya
∣∣
ν=νm
= B
1
1−α(1−ϕ) νm
α(1−ϕ)
1−α(1−ϕ)
Therefore
∂ya
∂νm
∣∣∣∣
ν=νm
=
α(1− ϕ)
1− α(1− ϕ)
B
1
1−α(1−ϕ) νm
α(1−ϕ)
1−α(1−ϕ)
−1 =
α(1− ϕ)
1− α(1− ϕ)
ya
ν
∣∣∣∣
ν=νm
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We now have to compute the free trade counterpart of this quantity, ∂y
ft
∂ν
∣∣∣∣
ν=νm
. Since, we consider
the case where we open the economy in a neighborhood of the steady state, it has to be the case that
k? 6 k˜(p) so that
yft
∣∣
ν=νm
= Φpϕ−1
(
1 +
α
1− α
(
(1− α)Aθ
1−α
p
) 1
α−ε(1−α)
k?
α
α−ε(1−α)
)
using the definition of ν, we obtain
y? = Φpϕ−1
(
1 +
α
1− α
(
(1− α)Aθ
1−α
p
) 1
α−ε(1−α)
(νmy?)
α
α−ε(1−α)
)
Taking the total derivative of this expression, we obtain
dy =
α
α− ε(1− α)
Φpϕ−1
(
α
1− α
(
(1− α)Aθ
1−α
p
) 1
α−ε(1−α)
(νmy)
α
α−ε(1−α)
)
dν
ν
+
α
α− ε(1− α)
Φpϕ−1
(
α
1− α
(
(1− α)Aθ
1−α
p
) 1
α−ε(1−α)
(νmy)
α
α−ε(1−α)
)
dy
y
where it should be clear that y stands for yft
∣∣∣∣
ν=νm
and ν stands for νm. Remembering that Φ =
ϕϕ(1− ϕ)1−ϕ, θ = (1− σ?)−ε, σ? = ϕϕ+(1−α)(1−ϕ) and p =
1−ϕ
ϕ
σ?
A(1−σ)1−αk?α , it is straightforward to see
that the latter equation reduces to
dy = α(1− ϕ)
α
α− ε(1− α)
ya
ν
dν + α(1− ϕ)
α
α− ε(1− α)
dy
Hence,
∂yft
∂ν
∣∣∣∣
ν=νm
=
α2(1− ϕ)
α(1− α(1− ϕ))− ε(1− α)
×
ya
ν
∣∣∣∣
ν=νm
=
α(1− α(1− ϕ))
α(1− α(1− ϕ))− ε(1− α)
×
∂ya
∂ν
∣∣∣∣
ν=νm
Since 0 6 α 6 1, 0 6 ϕ 6 1 and ε > 0, we have α(1−α(1−ϕ))α(1−α(1−ϕ))−ε(1−α) > 1 such that
∂yft
∂ν
∣∣∣∣
ν=νm
> ∂y
a
∂ν
∣∣∣∣
ν=νm
In order to establish the second part of the proposition, and therefore the multimodal shape of the
distribution as ε tends to α from below, let us evaluate the density function in k˜(p). First of all note that
k = k˜(p) for a particular constant value of ν = ν, implying that the first component of the distribution
— that stemming from µν — is constant, µs = µs(ν). However, the second component stemming from
the derivative term depends fundamentally on how k˜(p) is reached. When k approaches k˜(p) from above,
the technology is its concave part, such that
lim
k↓k˜(p)
|f ′(y(k))| =
1− α
α
[
pA(1− α)θ
1−α
]− 1
α
(
1− α
Φpϕ−1
) 1−2α
α
Conversely, when k approaches k˜(p) from below, the technology is locally convex and
lim
k↑k˜(p)
|f ′(y(k))| =
α− ε
α
1− α
α
[
pA(1− α)θ
1−α
]− 1
α
(
1− α
Φpϕ−1
)2 (
Φpϕ−1
)α−ε(1−α)
α
The latter limit indicates that as ε tends to α, the left hand side of the distribution tends to zero as output
per worker approaches y(k˜(p)) while it remains positive on the right hand side. Therefore, provided the
pdf of the marginal propensity to accumulate, ν, is not degenerate, no matter its particular form, the
income distribution will exhibit at least 2 modes.
q.e.d 2
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Proposition 7 Let us first characterize ν and ν.
1. Characterizing ν: From Figure 4, it shall be clear that there are 2 candidates to be the lowest
possible value for the saving rate. The first one is such that k = k˜(p) and the second one satisfies
the two restrictions {
k = νy
1 = ν ∂y∂k
where ν = s/((1 + γ)(1 + n) − (1 − δ)). Each restriction is evaluated on the concave part of the
function — that is when σ = 0. We shall first show that this restriction is not relevant. Indeed
this amounts to solve the system {
k = νΦpϕAθ
1−α
kα
1 = ναΦpϕAθ
1−α
kα−1
for k and ν. But, multiplying the second equation by k and subtracting the first one from the
result, we get
ν(α− 1)y(k˜) = 0
This triggers ν = 0 and leads to k = 0, which cannot be the case as the economy is supposed to lie
on the concave part of the function, i.e. above k˜(p). Henceforth, this cannot be a solution.
Therefore, ν is such that k(ν) = k˜(p) =
(
A(1− α)θ
1−α
p
)−1/α
:
(
A(1− α)θ
1−α
p
)−1/α
= νΦpϕAθ
1−α
(
A(1− α)θ
1−α
p
)−1
implying
ν =
1− α
Φpϕ−1
(
A(1− α)θ
1−α
p
)−1/α
2. Characterizing ν: Figure 4 illustrates that if multiplicity occurs, it has to be the case that at least
one steady state should lie on the convex part of the curve. The highest possible value for the
saving rate that satisfies this restriction is such that the ray intersecting the production function
is also a tangent. This implies the 2 restrictions{
k = νy
1 = ν ∂y∂k
These 2 conditions, when evaluated on the convex part of the production function, lead to
k = νΦpϕ−1
(
1 +
α
1− α
(A(1− α)θ
1−α
p)
1
α−ε(1−α) k
α
α−ε(1−α)
)
(39)
1 = ν
α
α− ε(1− α)
Φpϕ−1
α
1− α
(A(1− α)θ
1−α
p)
1
α−ε(1−α) k
α
α−ε(1−α)
−1 (40)
Solving (40) for k, and denoting β = ε(1− α)/α, we get
k̂ ≡ k(ν) = ν
β−1
β
(
(1− α)(1− β)τ
αΦ
) 1−β
β (
A(1− α)θ
1−α
p
)−1/αβ
p
(1−ϕ)(1−β)
β
Plugging this expression in (39), and solving for ν, we get
ν =
(
1− α
α
)1−β (
A(1− α)θ
1−α
p
)−1/α ββ(1− β)1−β
Φpϕ−1
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Note that as ε tends to α, β tends toward 1− α, implying that ν tends to ν. In other word,
lim
ε→α
ν = ν
We now show that the economy admits at least 3 steady states. Let us recall that the steady state of
any of the small open economies we consider can be characterized by
k = νy
where y is defined by proposition 3. Therefore, we can define the steady state function ϑ(k) = y/k, which
at each 1/ν associates one or several steady states. This function takes the form
ϑ(k) =
{
Φ
k p
ϕ−1
(
1 + α1−α (A(1− α)θ
1−α
p)
1
α−ε(1−α) k
α
α−ε(1−α)
)
for k 6 k˜(p)
ΦpϕAθ
1−α
kα−1 for k > k˜(p)
Uniqueness of the steady state then corresponds to the fact that this function is one–to–one over the
whole interval, for which a necessary condition is monotonicity. As can be seen from the definition of the
ϑ(k), it is monotonically decreasing for k > k˜(p) since α ∈ (0, 1). Therefore, monotonicity requires the
function to be decreasing for values of the capital labor ratio k ∈ (0, k˜(p)]. Over the latter interval,
ϑ′(k) =
Φpϕ−1
k2
[
ε(1− α)
α− ε(1− α)
α
1− α
(
A(1− α)θ
1−α
p
) 1
α−ε(1−α)
k
α
α−ε(1−α) − 1
]
such that
ϑ′(k) T 0⇐⇒ k T k̂ ≡
(
α− ε(1− α)
αε
)α−ε(1−α)
α (
A(1− α)θ
1−α
p
)− 1
α
= ςk˜(p)
where ς ≡
(
α−ε(1−α)
αε
)α−ε(1−α)
α
. Further, ς is lower than one as long as ε > α. Therefore, there exists
k̂ ∈ (0, k˜(p)) such that the sign of the slope of ϑ(k) switches from negative to positive. Finally, note that
— by definition of n and n
ϑ(k̂) =
1
ν
and ϑ(k˜(p)) =
1
ν
Therefore, to recap, ϑ(k) is a decreasing function for k ∈ (0, k̂ ≡ k(ν)), (equivalently ν ∈ (ν, 1)) and
an increasing function for k ∈ (k̂, k˜(p)), (equivalently ν ∈ (ν, ν)). Then for any value of k > k˜(p)
(equivalently ν ∈ (0, ν), ϑ(.) is a decreasing function, that is depicted in Figure 11. Hence, for any
ν ∈ (ν, ν), there exist 3 values of k such that ϑ(k) = 1/ν.
q.e.d 2
Proposition 8 As established in proposition 7, when trade is free α < ε < α1−α , the open economy
admits 3 steady states.
Let us focus first on the upper steady state that arises when the economy fully specializes in the production
of good 2. In such a situation, σ = 0 and the production function reduces to
yt = Φpt
ϕAkαt θ
1−α
such that the dynamics of capital writes
(1 + n)(1 + γ)kt+1 = sΦpt
ϕAkαt θ
1−α
+ (1− δ)kt
In the neighborhood of the steady state, the log–linearized version of the dynamics writes
xt+1 = ωxt
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Figure 11: Multiplicity
6
-
k˜(p?)k̂ k
ϑ(k)
1/ν
1/ν
1/ν
where xt = log(kt/k) and ω =
(
α+ (1−α)(1−δ)(1+γ)(1+n)
)
< 1, for n, γ, δ > 0. Since ω < 1 this particular steady
state is locally stable.
Let us now focus on local dynamic properties of the economy, when there is no specialization. In this
case, the dynamics are given by the system:
kt+1 =
sΦ
(1 + γ)(1 + n)
pϕ−1t
[
1 +
α
1− α
(A(1− α)pt)
1
α θ
1−α
α
t kt
]
+
1− δ
(1 + γ)(1 + n)
kt (41)
θt+1 = θ(A(1− α)pt)
ε
α θ
α(1−α)
α
t k
ε
t (42)
The log–linear version of the system around a steady state yields the following representation(
kt+1
θt+1
)
=
(
ζ(k) + 1−δ(1+n)(1+γ) ζ(k)
1−α
α
ε ε 1−αα
)(
kt
θt
)
where
ζ(k) =
sΦ
(1 + γ)(1 + n)
pϕ−1
α
1− α
(
(1− α)Aθ
1−α
p
) 1
α−ε(1−α)
k
α
α−ε(1−α)
−1
Note that ζ ′(k) > 0. The local dynamic properties of this economy may then be revealed, studying the
properties of the characteristic polynomial, P (λ), of the approximated system
P (λ) = λ2 − Trλ+Det
where Tr and Det denote respectively the trace and the determinant of the above defined matrix
Tr = ζ(k) +
1− δ
(1 + n)(1 + γ)
+ ε
1− α
α
Det = ε
1− α
α
1− δ
(1 + n)(1 + γ)
First of all note that both the trace and the determinant of the matrix are positive implying that both
eigenvalues characterizing the local dynamic properties of the economy are positive since both their sum
and their product (P (0) = Det) are positive.
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Denoting a = 1−δ(1+n)(1+γ) and b = ε
1−α
α , the discriminant of the polynomial is given by
∆ = ζ(k)2 + 2(a+ b)ζ(k) + a2 + b2 + 2ab− 4ab = ζ(k)2 + 2(a+ b)ζ(k) + (a− b)2 > 0
Therefore, the two roots of the polynomial are real, implying that the polynomial crosses the zero line.
Let us now study P (1)
P (1) = 1− Tr +Det = 1−
(
ζ(k) +
1− δ
(1 + n)(1 + γ)
+ ε
1− α
α
)
+ ε
1− α
α
1− δ
(1 + n)(1 + γ)
which may be rewritten as
P (1) =
(
1−
ε(1− α)
α
)(
1−
1− δ
(1 + γ)(1 + n)
)
− ζ(k)
From proposition 7, we now that, in the case of multiplicity, two steady states are distributed on both
side of k̂ which is defined by
α
α− ε(1− α)
νΦpϕ−1
α
1− α
(A(1− α)θ
1−α
p)
1
α−ε(1−α) k̂
α
α−ε(1−α)
−1 = 1
which rewrites
α
α− ε(1− α)
(1 + γ)(1 + n)
(1 + γ)(1 + n)− (1− δ)
ζ(k̂) = 1⇐⇒ ζ(k̂) =
(
1−
ε(1− α)
α
)(
1−
1− δ
(1 + γ)(1 + n)
)
Then let us consider a situation where ν < ν, implying that k < k̂. Since ζ(.) is an increasing function
of k, we have
P (1) >
(
1−
ε(1− α)
α
)(
1−
1− δ
(1 + γ)(1 + n)
)
− ζ(k̂)
>
(
1−
ε(1− α)
α
)(
1−
1− δ
(1 + γ)(1 + n)
)
−
(
1−
ε(1− α)
α
)(
1−
1− δ
(1 + γ)(1 + n)
)
> 0
Further note that the derivative of the polynomial P ′(λ) = 2λ− Tr then equals zero for λ = Tr/2 > 0.
Since
Tr = ζ(k) +
1− δ
(1 + n)(1 + γ)
+ ε
1− α
α
and ζ(.) is an increasing function of k, we have fork < k̂ (ν < ν)
0 < Tr < ζ(k̂) +
1− δ
(1 + γ)(1 + n)
+ ε
1− α
α
<
(
1−
ε(1− α)
α
)(
1−
1− δ
(1 + γ)(1 + n)
)
+
1− δ
(1 + γ)(1 + n)
+ ε
1− α
α
< 1 +
ε(1− α)(1− δ)
α(1 + γ)(1 + n)
< 2
Since Tr < 2, we have λ ∈ (0, 1) implying that P ′(λ) shifts from negative to positive values between
zero and 1. Since P (0) = Det > 0, P (1) > 0 and the two roots are real, and given P ′(λ) switches from
negative to positive in (0, 1), we know that the two roots lie within the unit circle. Therefore, the steady
state lying below k̂ is stable.
Applying the same reasoning to the steady state above k̂, we find it unstable.
Therefore, for a given long run propensity to accumulate, any economy starting with an initial capital
labor ratio above the central steady state will converge to the upper steady state — therefore fully
specializing in good 2 — while if it starts just below the central steady state it will converge to the lower
steady state.
q.e.d 2
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Proposition 9: Before establishing the proposition, we need first to characterize the behavior of firms
in a given economy. Under free trade, the firm attempts to solve
max
σk,t,Kt,Qjt(`);j=1,2,`∈(0,1)
Z1t + ptZ2t − qtKt −
∫ 1
0
(pq1t(`)Q1t(`) + p
q
2t(`)Q2t(`)) d`
subject to 0 6 σk,t 6 1. This yields the set of conditions:
qt = α1
Z1t
Kt
+ α2p
Z2t
Kt
(43)
α1
Yt
σk,t
− α2p
Yt
1− σk,t
+ λ0k,t − λ
1
k,t = 0 (44)
pq1t(`) = (1− α1)Z1tQ1t(`)
ρ−1M−ρ1t (45)
pq2t(`) = (1− α2)ptZ2tθ
s
t(`)
ρQ2t(`)
ρ−1M−ρ2t (46)
λ0k,tσk,t = 0 (47)
λ1k,t(1− σk,t) = 0 (48)
The intermediate firm then maximizes
max
{Lt>0,σt(`)∈[0,1]}
pq1t(`)σt(`)ΓtLt(`) + p
q
2t(`)(1− σt(`))ΓtLt(`)−WtLt(`) (49)
subject to (45) and (46). The set of first order conditions is then given by
Wt = ρ(1− α1)Z1t
Q1t(`)
ρ
Lt(`)
M −ρ1t + ρ(1− α2)ΓtptZ2tθ
s
t(`)
ρQ2t(`)
ρ
Lt(`)
M−ρ2t (50)
ρ(1− α1)Z1t
Q1t(`)
ρ
σt(`)
M −ρ1t − ρ(1− α2)ptZ2tθ
s
t(`)
ρ Q2t(`)
ρ
1− σt(`)
M−ρ2t + λ
0
L,t − λ
1
L,t = 0 (51)
λ0L,tσL,t = 0 (52)
λ1L,t(1− σL,t) = 0 (53)
In a symmetric equilibrium, we have
σL,t(`) = σt Lt(`) = Lt
Q1t(`) = Q1t Q2t(`) = Q2t
Furthermore, rational expectations and symmetric equilibrium imply that θst(`) = θt(`) = θt, such that
M1t = Q1t = σL,tΓtLt and M2t = θtQ2t = θt(1− σL,t)ΓtLt. Hence, the labor allocation choice becomes
ρ(1− α1)Z1t(ΓtLt)
ρσt(`)
ρ−1(σL,tΓtLt)
−ρ
− ρ(1− α2)ptZ2tθ
ρ
t (ΓtLt)
ρ(1− σL,t)
ρ−1(θt(1− σL,t)ΓtLt)
−ρ
+ λ0L,t − λ
1
L,t = 0 (54)
An interior solution for σk and σL implies, from (44) and (54)
σk,t
σL,t
=
α1(1− α2)
α2(1− α1)
×
1− σk,t
1− σL,t
(55)
We can now formally prove the proposition. A simple way to check that output–per–worker is locally
convex is to show that the user cost of capital is increasing in capital. In a non–specialized symmetric
equilibrium, the user cost of capital is given by
qt = α1
z1,t
kt
+ α2p
z2,t
kt
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where lowercases denote aggregate levels deflated for both technological progress and population growth.
Recall that in a symmetric equilibrium, the allocation of capital and labor, in the non specialized area,
is determined by
α1
z1t
σk,t
6 α2pt
z2t
1− σk,t
(56)
(1− α1)
z1t
σL,t
6 (1− α2)pt
z2t
1− σL,t
(57)
Therefore, the user cost of capital rewrites
qt = α1
z1,t
kt
σk,t
σk,t
+ α2p
z2,t
kt
1− σk,t
1− σk,t
= α1
z1,t
σk,tkt
σk,t + α1
z1,t
σk,tkt
(1− σk,t)
= α1
z1,t
σk,tkt
= α1A1
(
σk,tkt
σL,t
)α1−1
Using (55) , one can express σk,t/σL,t as a function of σL,t only
σk,t
σL,t
=
α1(1− α2)
α2(1− α1)− (α2 − α1)σL,t
(58)
Therefore, qt simplifies to
qt = α1A1k
α1−1
t
(
α2(1− α1)− (α2 − α1)σL,t
α1(1− α2)
)1−α1
(59)
Then
dqt
dkt
=
∂qt
∂kt
+
∂qt
∂σk,t
∂σk,t
∂kt
Using (59), we find
∂qt
∂kt
= α1(α1 − 1)
z1,t
σk,tk2t
∂qt
∂σk,t
= −
α1(1− α1)(α2 − α1)
α2(1− α1)− (α2 − α1)σL,t
×
z1,t
σk,tkt
Therefore
dqt
dkt
= −α1(1− α1)
z1,t
σk,tkt
(
1
kt
+
(α2 − α1)
α2(1− α1)− (α2 − α1)σL,t
∂σk,t
∂kt
)
Note that since 0 6 α1, α2 6 1, σL,t ∈ (0, 1) and α2 > α1, we have α2(1−α1)− (α2−α1)σL,t > 0 Hence,
a necessary condition for the user cost of capital to be an increasing function of capital is
∂σk,t
∂kt
6 −α2(1− α1)− (α2 − α1)σL,t
(α2 − α1)kt
We thus have to compute ∂σk,t/∂kt.
In a symmetric equilibrium, (σL,t, σk,t) is obtained from the system (56)–(57). The ratio of the two
relations yields (55), that can be plugged into (57) to give
(1− α1)A1
(
σk,t
σL,t
kt
)α1
= (1− α2)A2θ
1−α2
(
α2(1− α1)
α1(1− α2)
σk,t
σL,t
kt
)α2
(1− σL,t)
ε(1−α2)
Making use of (58), the latter expression rewrites
α2(1− α1)− (α2 − α1)σL,t = Ω(p)kt(1− σL,t)
ε(1−α2)
α2−α1 (60)
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where
Ω(p) =
[
p
αα22 (1− α2)
1−α1
αα11 (1− α1)
1−α2
θ
1−α2A1
A2
] 1
α2−α1
Differentiating (60) with respect to kt, we get
−(α2 − α1)
∂σL,t
∂kt
= Ω(p)(1− σL,t)
ε(1−α2)
α2−α1 −
ε(1− α2)
α2 − α1
Ω(p)kt(1− σL,t)
ε(1−α2)
α2−α1
−1 ∂σL,t
∂kt
which, from (60), rewrites
∂σL,t
∂kt
=
α2(1− α1)− (α2 − α1)σL,t
kt
×
1
ε(1−α2)
α2−α1
α2(1−α1)−(α2−α1)σL,t
1−σL,t
− (α2 − α1)
Then
∂σk,t
∂kt
6 −α2(1− α1)− (α2 − α1)σL,t
(α2 − α1)kt
amounts to
α2(1− α1)− (α2 − α1)σL,t
kt
×
1
ε(1−α2)
α2−α1
α2(1−α1)−(α2−α1)σL,t
1−σL,t
− (α2 − α1)
6 −α2(1− α1)− (α2 − α1)σL,t
(α2 − α1)kt
which, since α2(1− α1)− (α2 − α1)σL,t > 0, simplifies to
α2 − α1
ε(1−α2)
α2−α1
α2(1−α1)−(α2−α1)σL,t
1−σL,t
− (α2 − α1)
6 −1
or
ε(1−α2)
α2−α1
α2(1−α1)−(α2−α1)σL,t
1−σL,t
ε(1−α2)
α2−α1
α2(1−α1)−(α2−α1)σL,t
1−σL,t
− (α2 − α1)
6 0 (61)
Note that (58) implies
α2(1− α1)− (α2 − α1)σL,t = α1(1− α2)
σL,t
σk,t
= α2(1− α1)
1− σL,t
1− σk,t
such that (61) rewrites
ε(1−α2)
α2−α1
α2(1−α1)
1−σK,t
ε(1−α2)
α2−α1
α2(1−α1)
1−σK,t
− (α2 − α1)
6 0
Since ε > 0, 0 6 α1, α2 6 1, α2 > α1, the numerator is positive, such that a condition for ∂qt∂kt > 0 is
ε(1− α2)
α2 − α1
α2(1− α1)
1− σK,t
− (α2 − α1) 6 0
or
ε 6 (α2 − α1)
2
α2(1− α1)(1− α2)
(1− σK,t) 6
(α2 − α1)
2
α2(1− α1)(1− α2)
which completes the proof.
 q.e.d
